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vendredi 10 décembre 2010
13:31
matine salim
dimanche 5 décembre 2010
| 09MADRID71 | SPAIN: DEPARTING AMBASSADOR'S INSIGHTS ON ENGAGING | 2009-01-21 | 2010-12-04 | SECRET | Embassy Madrid |
| 10RABAT8 | GUINEA: THE WAY FORWARD | 2010-01-08 | 2010-12-04 | SECRET | Embassy Rabat |
| 04SANAA2346 | PRESIDENT SALEH TO A/S BLOOMFIELD "NO NEW MANPADS" | 2004-09-02 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Sanaa |
| 05SANAA923 | SALEH ON KANAAN: WE'VE GOT HIM!! | 2005-04-13 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Sanaa |
| 06LAPAZ886 | EVO AND HIS ADVISORY CIRCLE (PART 1 OF 3) | 2006-03-30 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy La Paz |
| 06LAPAZ906 | THE ROLE EVO'S "INTELLECTUALS" PLAY (PART 2 OF 3) | 2006-03-31 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy La Paz |
| 06LAPAZ908 | EVO'S POLITICAL ADVISERS (PART 3 OF 3) | 2006-03-31 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy La Paz |
| 07SANAA473 | S) UNMANNED USG AIRCRAFT WASHES ASHORE, OFFICIAL | 2007-04-02 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Sanaa |
| 07ALGIERS652 | ALGERIANS OFFER NEARLY ALL ASSURANCES NEEDED FOR | 2007-05-13 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Algiers |
| 07LAPAZ3153 | VENEZUELA-BOLIVIA: HOW MUCH FIRE BEHIND THE SMOKE? | 2007-11-30 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy La Paz |
| 08RABAT194 | NEA A/S WELCH AND DIRECTOR GENERAL MANSOURI REVIEW | 2008-03-03 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Rabat |
| 08ALGIERS261 | ALGERIAN LEADERSHIP TOWS WESTERN SAHARA LINE WITH | 2008-03-03 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Algiers |
| 09STATE34688 | U) Secretary Clinton’s April 7, 2009 meeting | 2009-04-09 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Secretary of State |
| 09BAKU478 | IRAN VIEW FROM BAKU: VIOLENCE IN BALUCHISTAN | 2009-06-12 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Baku |
| 09ALGIERS1077 | BOUTEFLIKA TO WARD: WE WANT A STRATEGIC | 2009-12-06 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Algiers |
| 09SANAA2250 | YEMEN ABUZZ WITH TALK OF CT OPERATIONS; TTENTION SLOWLY TURNS TO U.S. ROLE | 2009-12-21 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Sanaa |
| 10SANAA45 | SALEH STICKS TO HIS CT GUNS, BUT OFFERS A WAY OUT | 2010-01-11 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Sanaa |
| 10BAGHDAD167 | PRT MUTHANNA: RENTAL SHEIKS AND LOST IRANIAN | 2010-01-22 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Baghdad |
| 10BAKU98 | IRAN: JAFARI REPORTEDLY SLAPS AHMEDINEJAD AT SNSC | 2010-02-11 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Baku |
| 10RIYADH184 | TWO FACES OF SAUDI ARABIA’S CLIMATE NEGOTIATING | 2010-02-12 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Riyadh |
| 10STATE18437 | MALDIVES AMBASSADOR’S WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS | 2010-02-26 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Secretary of State |
| 08STOCKHOLM494 | PROPOSED RESPONSE TO SWEDISH REQUEST TO RELEASE | 2008-07-09 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Stockholm |
Viewing cable 08STOCKHOLM494, PROPOSED RESPONSE TO SWEDISH REQUEST TO RELEASE
VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHSM #0494/01 1911414 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 091414Z JUL 08 FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3590 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 2480 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0293 RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 3150 RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0319 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 000494 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2018 TAGS: PARM MOPS MARR PREL ECON PGOV SW SUBJECT: PROPOSED RESPONSE TO SWEDISH REQUEST TO RELEASE AESA RADAR FOR GRIPEN FIGHTER PLANES REF: A. USDAO STOCKHOLM DTG 051506ZJUN2008 B. IIR 6 982 0173 Classified By: Ambassador Michael Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary ------- ¶1. (S) Embassy Stockholm recommends we postpone a response to the Swedish request for release of AESA radar for Swedish Gripens until after Norway's selection of its next fighter jet, currently slated for December 2008. In informing Sweden of this delay, we should consider offering U.S. support for the enhanced Nordic military cooperation proposals, and also consider a SecDef visit in the fall, per GOS request. End Summary. The Swedish Case for AESA ------------------------- ¶2. (S) In a June 25 meeting with the Ambassador, Minister of Defense Sten Tolgfors reviewed Sweden's arguments on the benefits to the U.S. of release of AESA radar for use on the SAAB JAS Gripen 39 fighters for the Nordic Region (refs A and B): -- AESA on Gripens would enhance NATO interoperability; -- Sweden works closely with the U.S. and NATO on security and makes important contributions through military deployments under NATO aegis in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Sweden supports a greater role for Europe in Iraq, where Sweden is opening an Embassy and recently hosted the International Compact with Iraq conference in Stockholm; -- The Gripen contains 50 percent U.S. content, including engines, avionics and weapon systems; sales of the Gripen are good for U.S. industry. AESA would increase U.S. content and enhance sales prospects; -- Sweden supports Nordic military cooperation, which moves Sweden closer to NATO. Postponing a Response on AESA ----------------------------- ¶3. (S) Our original report on AESA releaseability reviewed the Swedish case (ref A). We now supplement our recommendations to call for a postponement, taking into account the potential impact on the Norway fighter jet competition. Our recommendation for postponement is based on the following three points: -- The Swedish government has requested the granting of U.S. export licenses for Raytheon's Advanced Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar to be used on SAAB JAS Gripen 39 fighters for the Nordic Region (refs A and B), asserting that this would enhance Nordic region air coverage and interoperability. The Gripen is competing with the Lockheed Martin F35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) for a sale to Norway of 48 fighter aircraft. Norway is expected to take the decision on the Gripen vs the JSF by early December. The Gripen is also competing with the JSF and Boeing's F-18 for a later sale to Denmark of an additional 48 fighters. Swedish officials and SAAB want AESA radar in time to make the Gripen more competitive. Swedish officials tell us they anticipate a decision from Washington on AESA releaseability by September 2008. -- Given this potential impact of AESA releaseability on the Norway competition, and possibly the Denmark competition, we suggest postponing the decision on AESA releaseability for the Gripen until after Norway's decision in December. We futher recommend informing the Swedes of this delay in advance. This recommendation supplements ref A assessment of releaseability. -- If this course is chosen, we should also explore doing something else for Sweden to demonstrate our bilateral engagement and support for Nordic cooperation, while informing them of the delay. We recommend exploring offers to support aspects of the Sweden's proposals for enhanced Nordic cooperation. This is politically and economically important to all the Nordic and especially to Sweden. It is likely that many of the approximately 140 recommendations for Nordic cooperation would benefit from U.S. support and be in our interest. We propose also a favorable response to ref B request for a visit to Sweden by Secretary of Defense Gates in fall 2008. WOOD
Viewing cable 10STATE18437, MALDIVES AMBASSADOR’S WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS
VZCZCXRO4761 PP RUEHAG RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL DE RUEHC #8437/01 0572246 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 262241Z FEB 10 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 6789 INFO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 3218 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 6612 RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 2886 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 6767 RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 4427 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 9528 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2499 RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 0169 RUEHNEH/AMCONSUL HYDERABAD PRIORITY 0203 RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 7618 RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA PRIORITY 3568 RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 8840 RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 3260 RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 3444 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0551 RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0125
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 018437 SIPDIS E.O. 12958 DECL: 02/24/2020 TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PHUM, EAID, ECON, EFIN, ELAB, MARR, MASS, OEXC, OFDP, PINS, SCUL, SENV, SNAR, IMF, UN, KGHG, KDRG, MV SUBJECT: MALDIVES AMBASSADOR’S WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS Classified By: SCA A/S Robert O. Blake, Jr. reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY. Maldives Ambassador-designate (resident in New York) Abdul Ghafoor Mohamed held his first consultations in Washington February 23, ahead of his presentation of credentials to POTUS February 24. Meeting with SCA, S/SECC, S/GC, and OSD, Ghafoor said he would prioritize developing education and parliamentary exchanges during his ambassadorship; expressed confidence that Maldives would win a seat on the UN Human Rights Council; confirmed his government’s willingness to take a Guantanamo detainee; underscored the importance of tangible assistance being provided by the larger economies to small countries at the forefront of the climate change debate; and expressed appreciation for U.S. training of Maldives security personnel. He also noted his government’s interest in additional training and assistance with customs and border security and prison management. END SUMMARY. Confident on UNHRC; Keen on Educational Partnerships -------------------------------- ¶2. (C) Pre-viewing Ambassador Ghafoor’s meetings with Deputy S/SECC Pershing and S/GC Ambassador Fried, SCA A/S Robert Blake expressed appreciation to Ghafoor for Maldives’s willingness to accept a Guantanamo detainee, and President Nasheed’s strong personal effort in Copenhagen to reach an Accord. Blake also pulsed Ghafoor on Maldives’s candidacy for the Human Rights Council. Ghafoor said he was confident Maldives could get one of the four Asia Group seats; he did not think Iran, lacking Arab support, had the votes. His only concern was that Thailand and Maldives could split their votes and that Iran is working African capitals. As such, Maldives is not only lobbying Asian missions, but also African missions. Blake offered quiet U.S. assistance if it would be helpful; Ghafoor appreciated it and said Maldives might take us up on it. But Maldives needed to be seen as earning the seat in its own right. As a small country, he said, Maldives can’t play other countries against each other; it needs to take principled positions (e.g. Kosovo recognition). ¶3. (SBU) Ghafoor appreciated U.S. efforts to help push the IMF and Maldives toward agreement, but that the conditionality was “harsh.” Wage cuts have been politically difficult. Referring to the March 28-29 Maldives donors conference, Ghafoor said international assistance would help the government win over the public and implement its development program. Ghafoor said that promoting educational exchanges and partnerships between the U.S. and Maldives would offer an alternative to students who currently go to Islamic schools in Pakistan and Egypt, where they could become radicalized. A/S Blake suggested Ghafoor reach out to U.S. schools and offered assistance to help build public-private partnerships, such as, for example, a college in the hotel and restaurant management field. Ghafoor was also keen to pursue parliamentary exchanges and to receive CODELs in Maldives, as well as to promote a U.S.-Maldives caucus or friendship association in Congress. We suggested he reach out to National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute, and that we would help arrange meetings for him with Congressional staff. Ready to Assist with Detainee ----------------------------- ¶4. (S) S/GC Ambassador Daniel Fried conveyed U.S. appreciation for Maldives’s willingness to resettle a STATE 00018437 002 OF 003 Guantanamo detainee. Ghafoor said Maldives is ready to act quickly on the resettlement. Logistics remain to be worked out between the Home Ministry and the Embassy. Fried detailed those logistics, including finalizing transfer arrangements, concluding an exchange of diplomatic notes (that would include security measures), and requiring GORM permission to notify the candidate. Fried said we would keep the information close hold until we transferred the detainee; noted the offer of $85,000 to assist his resettlement expenses; and offered to make himself available for interviews should the GORM want help shaping any press messaging. Fried stressed the importance of working out more detailed security arrangements for the detainee, along the lines of those applied in other countries that have accepted Guantanamo detainees for resettlement; Embassy Colombo could work directly with the Maldivian government on those arrangements. Climate Change: Maldives Seeks Concrete Action --------------------------------------------- - ¶5. (SBU) Meeting with Deputy S/SECC Jonathan Pershing, Ghafoor referred to Copenhagen as a stepping stone toward a legally binding agreement; Maldives is prepared to accept any form of treaty/accord that would lead to concrete action. He said he saw a reluctance within the United States Congress to take action. He would like Maldivian President Nasheed to have the opportunity to speak before Congress in order to provide a sincere voice for the urgency of climate change. Pershing asked if Ghafoor had a sense of why only 105 of 192 countries had associated themselves with the Accord. Ghafoor replied that, following the commitments of the U.S., China and India at Copenhagen, and despite opposition from a small, vocal minority of countries, there had been a political shift; many countries from CARICOM, the African Union (led by Ethiopia), and AOSIS will come to associate with Copenhagen and engage on subsequent agreements. These coalitions must be coaxed and not pushed into making decisions and meeting deadlines. Pershing noted that chairmanship of organizational meetings was vital. ¶6. (SBU) Ghafoor added that Maldives would like to see that small countries, like Maldives, that are at the forefront of the climate debate, receive tangible assistance from the larger economies. Other nations would then come to realize that there are advantages to be gained by compliance. Pershing noted that Copenhagen provides a generic framework for assistance, but that the next steps are procedural. He asked about Maldivian adaptation programs. Ghafoor referred to several projects, including harbor deepening and strengthening sea walls, that are in the development stage. These projects would cost approximately $50 million. Pershing encouraged Ghafoor to provide concrete examples and specific costs in order to increase the likelihood of bilateral assistance and congressional appropriations. Ghafoor proposed that President Obama deliver a speech on climate change from Maldives when he next visits the region. He said Maldives would provide a dramatic backdrop and draw further attention to environmental challenges the islands face. Strengthening Security Cooperation ---------------------------------- ¶7. (SBU) Meeting with Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for South and Southeast Asia Robert Scher, Ghafoor expressed appreciation for the warm reception he had been receiving in Washington. He said that Maldivian soldiers and police (many now senior staff officials) that were trained by the U.S. have earned the respect of both the government and the citizens of Maldives. (NOTE: Ghafoor’s brother is a retired director of the Maldivian National Defense Force. END NOTE.) He said he looked forward to continued cooperation in this field. Scher asked how U.S. training STATE 00018437 003 OF 003 compared with that of India in terms of quantity and quality. Ghafoor said that both were substantive and substantial. He acknowledged that Maldives also interacts with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, as one might expect of a 100 percent Muslim country situated in the region. Scher indicated that the U.S. did not want to get in the way of Maldivian relationships with its neighbors. Ghafoor assessed that New Delhi’s perception of the U.S. has evolved and that Male would be able to address any concerns. He stated that his government would not let relations with India impact relations with the United States, reflecting Maldives’s attempt to “show balance” in the past. Ghafoor replied that, if necessary, Maldives would explain that neither India nor Pakistan need suspect anything “untoward.” Ghafoor also noted that young people can receive free education (in Islamic Studies) in Egypt and Pakistan. Scher asked if all of the students return to Maldives after their studies. Ghafoor said that some had been apprehended in round ups in Pakistan, where they had been recruited by extremists. He said he believed that such exposure led to a rise in fundamentalist views within Maldives’s peaceful and tolerant culture. “It used to be simply a question of faith; now you must show that you are more Muslim than others,” he said. Increased access to liberal western education would help to combat growing fundamentalist trends, he suggested. Scher pointed out that that some groups would hope to exploit this lack of education, and that it was good to hear that Maldivian authorities were actively monitoring the situation. Ghafoor acknowledged that human rights must allow for freedom of expression and said Maldives is looking for guidance on how to peaceably marry two often conflicting agendas, freedom and internal security. Scher replied that hatred is better faced head-on by a benevolent government rather than pushed underground. 8. (SBU) Ghafoor noted that drug use in Maldives has led to a rise in crime that President Nasheed has pledged to combat with prevention and rehabilitation. In the past, criminals were simply “banished” to a different island. He inquired about training assistance with management of prison facilities and the training of correctional officers. Scher pointed out that this would be a matter better addressed by State/INL, DOJ and USAID. Ghafoor noted that 99 percent of Maldives is extremely vulnerable to attack from the sea. More specifically, he said that an attack (such as by Somali pirates) on an island resort would cripple the country’s economy. Maldives is seeking additional equipment and training from the U.S. on customs and border security. Scher expressed DOD’s interest in expanding bilateral defense and security engagement, continuing training, and helping build the Maldives’s maritime security capabilities to counteract the threat from terrorism, piracy, and trafficking. CLINTON
Viewing cable 10RIYADH184, TWO FACES OF SAUDI ARABIA’S CLIMATE NEGOTIATING
VZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHRH #0184/01 0431416 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 121416Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2481 INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T RIYADH 000184 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, EEB/ESC/IEC (MONOSSON), S/CIEA (GOLDWYN, SULLIVAN), S/SECC (STERN, PERSHING, ROCHBERG) DEPT PASS TO DOE FOR JONATHAN ELKIND, JAMES HART E.O. 12958 DECL: 02/09/2020 TAGS KGHG, SENV, EPET, ENRG, PREL, SA SUBJECT: TWO FACES OF SAUDI ARABIA’S CLIMATE NEGOTIATING POSITION REF: A. 09DHAHRAN 201 B. 09RIYADH 1302 C. 09RIYADH 1397 D. 09RIYADH 1492 E. 09RIYADH 1557 F. 09RIYADH 1642 G. RIYADH 103 H. SECSTATE 3080 I. SECSTATE 11182 Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary ------- ¶1. (S) Saudi Arabia is officially still studying the issue of whether to associate with the Copenhagen Accord on Climate Change. Behind the scenes, we understand serious discussions are taking place about which road will best serve the Kingdom’s long term interests. On one hand, Saudi Arabia’s lead climate change negotiator has criticized the Copenhagen process in private and in public, arguing that the UNFCCC process is the only acceptable legal framework. On the other hand, Saudi officials are very eager to obtain investment credits for Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and other technology transfer projects that will only become available once an agreement has been reached. Saudi officials express concern about the impact a transition to a low-carbon energy mix will have on the country’s revenue stream at a time when it faces enormous financing needs to transform its economy to create jobs for its young, growing population. It also fears imposed economic costs associated with “demonizing” oil. Part of the explanation for this schizophrenic position is that the Saudi Government has not yet thought through all the implications of a climate change agreement, in part because it may not fully understand the various demand scenarios. There appears to be a growing sense within the SAG that it may be in danger of becoming isolated on climate change, which may prompt a re-examination of its position. Saudi officials have suggested that they need to find a way to climb down gracefully from the country’s tough negotiating position. More sustained engagement in coordination with other governments, particularly if pitched as an effort to develop partnership, may help them do so. End Summary. Saudi Arabia not yet Decided on Copenhagen Accord --------------------------------------------- ----- ¶2. (C) Saudi Arabia’s lead climate change negotiator Dr. Mohammad Al-Sabban told Econoffs February 3 the United States should adopt a more inclusive, transparent approach to United Nations Forum for Climate Change Cooperation (UNFCCC) negotiations. Although he was encouraged by President Obama’s attitude towards developing country partners in the negotiations, Al-Sabban said the parties needed to “learn from the mistakes” of Copenhagen in thinking about preparing for the next Conference of Parties (CoP) in Mexico. Al-Sabban said developing countries felt their Danish hosts forced them to decide on the Copenhagen Accord with practically no notice. Heads of state were also called into the negotiations too early and they applied too much pressure “when the deal was not there,” he said. In specific response to the U.S. request for support for the Copenhagen Accord (ref H), Al-Sabban said Saudi Arabia was still studying the accord to determine its position. The SAG cares about the environment, but it also must care for its citizens, he said. Addressing Saudi Economic Concerns Key to Progress --------------------------------------------- ----- ¶3. (C) Asked how to move forward on a global climate change commitment, Al-Sabban agreed negotiations need a “speedy outcome,” and said countries need to rebuild trust and confidence through more transparent negotiations. He reminisced fondly about the inclusive nature of the initial Kyoto Protocol negotiations, which he said should be replicated in Cancun. Al-Sabban said climate change negotiations should remain under the UNFCCC and not be pursued under alternative frameworks. ¶4. (C) Asked about tangible actions to reach national climate change goals, Al-Sabban said Saudi Arabia’s nationally appropriate actions would include carbon capture and storage (CCS) credits. He emphasized Saudi Arabia’s need for technology transfer and foreign direct investment to mitigate the adverse impact that emissions-reducing policies may have on the Kingdom. Al-Sabban said the SAG had closely studied climate change policies’ potential negative impacts. The Kingdom will need time to diversify its economy away from petroleum, he said, noting that a U.S. commitment to help Saudi Arabia with its economic diversification efforts would “take the pressure off climate change negotiations.” ¶5. (C) Al-Sabban said the development of renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies was key to addressing Saudi Arabia’s domestic energy demand, and he acknowledged the need for increased energy efficiency awareness. The deployment of CCS technology, he said, was “crucial” for Saudi Arabia. He said the U.S. Administration’s rhetoric to end dependence on foreign oil, reiterated by President Obama in Copenhagen, is antagonistic and causes genuine fear in Saudi Arabia. The SAG is concerned about the outlook for oil demand and global production , and fears it will not be able to diversify in time to reach its development goals. Shadow Negotiator Suggests Partnership -------------------------------------- ¶6. (C) Senior Advisor to the President of Meteorology and Environment (PME) Fawaz Al-Alamy told Econoffs January 27 the U.S. and Saudi Arabia share the same values on climate change, but have different negotiation tactics. Al-Alamy, who joined PME in late 2009 and led Saudi Arabia’s World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, said Saudi Petroleum Minister Ali Al-Naimi wants to move forward in UNFCCC negotiations. (Note: PME sends three representatives with Al-Sabban to climate change negotiations. End note.) Al-Sabban’s negative approach to negotiations “disheartens” him, as does the ongoing “blame game” on climate change. Saudi Arabia, like China and India, needs to behave like an emerging economy rather than a developing country, he said. Al-Alamy noted he had met the previous day with both the Chinese and the Indian Ambassadors to the Kingdom to discuss climate change. ¶7. (C) Al-Alamy recommended several steps for U.S. engagement with Saudi Arabia on climate change, including active outreach to all the key players including Al-Sabban, Petroleum Minister Al-Naimi, and PME President Prince Turki bin Nasser. Al-Alamy recommended the U.S. reach out to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Secretary General, who has the power to tone down the alarm in the rest of the Arab world, such as in Egypt. Al-Alamy recommended the U.S. continue to coordinate its approach with other Embassies, which he said has been very effective. Asked how to get beyond the Kyoto Protocol lens through which Al-Sabban views climate negotiations, Al-Alamy quickly replied “he only has two more years to talk about Kyoto” before it expires. ¶8. (C) Al-Alamy said that Minister of Petroleum Al-Naimi strongly supports solar energy as he believes it will displace oil currently used in the power sector and ultimately increase oil exports. Saudi Arabia currently uses 1.5 million barrels per day to produce electricity and water, he said. The Kingdom is considering beginning a civilian nuclear program, and top leadership including Minister of Foreign Affairs Saud Al-Faisal supports the increased use of renewable energy sources. Some, however, view Copenhagen as a serious threat to Saudi Arabia’s economic stability. “Ask any Saudi,” Al-Alamy said, “they all think Saudi Arabia will be asked to foot the bill for climate change.” Al-Alamy outlined Saudi Arabia’s top concerns, including its strong aversion to mixing trade and environmental priorities. If duties are placed on oil and gas, Saudi Arabia will not be able to move ahead with its economic diversification plans, and this creates a “phobia” of climate change talks, he said. The Saudis also resent the U.S. when it makes decisions “without consulting its friends.” Al-Alamy said Saudi Arabia, and Al-Sabban in particular, needs to feel like a partner of U.S. decision making. Is Al-Naimi the Problem? ------------------------ ¶9. (S) Minister Al-Naimi has consistently been rational and practical in talking with western delegations about climate change, noting that Saudi Arabia had to address its development concerns, but conceding that the world needs to work together to address climate change. These reassuring statements stand in sharp contrast to Al-Sabban’s public comments, such as questioning the science behind climate change just before Copenhagen, and his often obstructionist behavior, as reported by a number of Embassies in Riyadh, during working-level negotiations. Senior Ministry of Petroleum officials have reassured us after each of Al-Sabban’s public outbursts over the last six months that he has been “tamed” and brought back onto the reservation. The frequency and number of times that Al-Sabban steps out of line, and the apparent lack of any sanction, raises questions about the real Saudi position on climate change. ¶10. (S) A recent conversation with UK Embassy officers suggests that indeed Al-Naimi may have some questions about climate change. They report that Al-Naimi was sharply critical of the Copenhagen meetings and the climate change effort in general, in marked contrast to earlier meetings. He complained that heads of state were brought in to negotiate the final stages, which prevented Saudi Arabia from voicing its true opposition to several elements. He also questioned the legality of the Copenhagen process and its future direction.
Viewing cable 10BAKU98, IRAN: JAFARI REPORTEDLY SLAPS AHMEDINEJAD AT SNSC
VZCZCXYZ0001 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHKB #0098 0421023 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 111023Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY BAKU TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2384 INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T BAKU 000098 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2020 TAGS: PGOV PARM PHUM AJ IR SUBJECT: IRAN: JAFARI REPORTEDLY SLAPS AHMEDINEJAD AT SNSC MEETING; TUDEH RE-EMERGING? REF: A. A) 2009 BAKU 972 ¶B. B) 2009 BAKU 921 ¶C. C) 2009 BAKU 920 (NOTAL) d. D) 2009 BAKU 909 Classified By: xxxxx for Reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (S) Baku Iran watcher met with xxxxx (strictly protect - see reftels). He who Got Slapped ------------------ ¶2. (S) According to source, President Ahmedinejad surprised other SNSC members by taking a surprisingly liberal posture during a mid January post-Ashura meeting of the SNSC called to discuss next steps on dealing with opposition protests. Source said that Ahmedinejad claimed that "people feel suffocated," and mused that to defuse the situation it may be necessary to allow more personal and social freedoms, including more freedom of the press. ¶3. (S) According to source, Ahmedinejad's statements infuriated Revolutionary Guard Chief of Staff Mohammed Ali Jafari, who exclaimed "You are wrong! (In fact) it is YOU who created this mess! And now you say give more freedom to the press?!" Source said that Jafarli then slapped Ahmedinejad in the face, causing an uproar and an immediate call for a break in the meeting, which was never resumed. Source said that SNSC did not meet again for another two weeks, after Ayatollah Janati succesfully acted as a "peacemaker" between Jafarli and Ahmedinejad. Source added that the break in the SNSC meeting, but not the slap that caused it, has made its way on to some Iranian blogs. Sides Preparing for New Confrontations -------------------------------------- ¶4. (S) Meanwhile, source said, both sides are digging in for new confrontations, while various sub-groups maneuver. He stressed the importance of recent speeches by Karroubi and Khatami to the effect that Ahmedinejad will not be able finish his term, and that Supreme Leaders should not take partisan political sides. He stressed that "Karroubi chooses each word carefully," and aid the recent speeches reflect an ongoing effort to split Khameini from the Ahmedinejad group. Source described the overall political situation within and without the political elite as "getting worse and worse." xxxxx opined that this situation (of protests and instability) cannot be sustained indefinitely, and predicted that events are trending towards major developments and a new phases. Asked what Iran will likely look like over the next year, he responded "ask me after 22 Bahman (February 11)." Tudeh Acticsts Re-Emerging? -------------------------- ¶5. (S) Source (a former non-Marxist revolutionary activist) also asserted that the Iranian Tudeh (communist) party is reorganizing among factory and government workers, and intellectuals. He claimed that many former Tudeh sympathizers hold positions in the bureaucracy and elsewhere, and opined that many still privately support the movement. He mentioned one xxxxx organizer who has re-emerged behind the scenes of recent bus worker and other labor strikes. Lu
Viewing cable 10BAGHDAD167, PRT MUTHANNA: RENTAL SHEIKS AND LOST IRANIAN
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S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000167 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2020 TAGS: PGOV KISL KCOR SUBJECT: PRT MUTHANNA: RENTAL SHEIKS AND LOST IRANIAN WEEKENDS REF: A. 08 BAGHDAD 3492 ¶B. 08 BAGHDAD 3654 Classified By: xxxxx for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ) ¶1. (U) This is a xxxxx reporting cable. ¶2. (S) SUMMARY: xxxxx met with local leader Sheikh xxxxx. During our lengthy discussions the Sheikh shared his belief that the USG has poorly utilized its influence in Iraq, leaving the way open for Iran to advance its agenda at USG expense. He went on to describe Iranian government attempts to buy his influence on a recent trip he made to Iran. End Summary. A new twist on &what happens in vegas, stays in vegas8 --------------------------------------------- --------- ¶3. (S) Sheikh xxxxx on January 13 to discuss his recent trip to Iran. He told the xxxxx that he has been courted by Iranian officials in an effort to garner more support and influence among well-placed Iraqis in the middle Euphrates area. He noted that the &handler8 for the tribal leaders in this area is xxxxx, who has long family ties locally. ¶4. (S) The public reason for xxxxx trip to Tehran was for a medical check-up. He privately told xxxxx that his trip was more for pleasure than medical treatment and included one or more short-term &marriages8 (i.e. with state-sanctioned prostitutes) and other entertainment. xxxxx shared that other (unnamed) tribal leaders had enjoyed similar privileges while guests of the Iranian regime recently. Dashed expectations ------------------- ¶5. (S) The Sheikh suggested that some Iraqi figures are more susceptible to Iranian influence because of disillusionment with the United States. During the meeting with xxxxx asked repeatedly, &Why have the Americans let us down?8 After he and other tribal sheikhs visited the White House and met then-President Bush in 2008, he expected to benefit financially from the Americans. Instead, he suggested that the Americans did nothing for him, even after he reported on Iranian activities in Muthanna (Ref A). &The United States did not secure their friends, the sheikhs, financially, and has left them vulnerable to Iranian temptations.8 ¶6. (S) xxxxx also complained that while tribal leaders in fairly stable areas used their influence to help minimize insurgent activities over the past several years, they have received nothing for their efforts. Cooperative sheikhs in insurgent hotbeds like Anbar, in contrast, received benefits from the Americans. xxxxx cited Abu Risha as an example, noting he received money, projects, and other perquisites for his cooperation. He finished by noting that several of the White House-invited tribal leaders have been quietly grumbling. He states that he has had conversations on this perceived inequity with parliamentarian xxxxx from Diwaniyah. ¶7. (S) Additionally, xxxxx was frustrated with the current regime in Baghdad. He stated that the United States' support of the Maliki government has only increased Iran's influence in Iraq, enabling operatives to influence political decisions and diminish national sovereignty. The Iraqi government has not made progress in fighting poverty, it has failed to provide essential services, and it is full of corruption. He asked if the United States is supporting Iran. &Why? Because you have American troops on the ground, but you are advancing Iranian interests without costing them anything.8 Comment ------- ¶8. (S) PRT COMMENT: Southern Iraqi sheikhs are well known Q8. (S) PRT COMMENT: Southern Iraqi sheikhs are well known for shifting their loyalties based on financial considerations. PM Maliki's Isnad/Tribal Support Councils are particularly noteworthy in this regard. Susceptible sheikhs will trade their influence for financial support especially if the sheikh is not independently wealthy. (Note: xxxxx and does not independently enjoy a large bankroll. End note.) In turn, the sheikh can mobilize supporters, when needed (e.g. Ref B). The influence, however, is rented and not bought. If the financial contributions suddenly stop, much of the support may also cease. xxxxx considers this true for Iranian influence in the region as well. If Iran continues to pay for support among influential sheikhs, the Islamic Republic will likely increase its influence. If and when the money dries up, so will the cooperation among these rented sheikhs. End Comment. Hill
