This is featured post 1 title
Replace these every slider sentences with your featured post descriptions.Go to Blogger edit html and find these sentences.
This is featured post 2 title
Replace these every slider sentences with your featured post descriptions.Go to Blogger edit html and find these sentences.
This is featured post 3 title
Replace these every slider sentences with your featured post descriptions.Go to Blogger edit html and find these sentences.
vendredi 10 décembre 2010
13:31
matine salim
dimanche 5 décembre 2010
| 09MADRID71 | SPAIN: DEPARTING AMBASSADOR'S INSIGHTS ON ENGAGING | 2009-01-21 | 2010-12-04 | SECRET | Embassy Madrid |
| 10RABAT8 | GUINEA: THE WAY FORWARD | 2010-01-08 | 2010-12-04 | SECRET | Embassy Rabat |
| 04SANAA2346 | PRESIDENT SALEH TO A/S BLOOMFIELD "NO NEW MANPADS" | 2004-09-02 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Sanaa |
| 05SANAA923 | SALEH ON KANAAN: WE'VE GOT HIM!! | 2005-04-13 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Sanaa |
| 06LAPAZ886 | EVO AND HIS ADVISORY CIRCLE (PART 1 OF 3) | 2006-03-30 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy La Paz |
| 06LAPAZ906 | THE ROLE EVO'S "INTELLECTUALS" PLAY (PART 2 OF 3) | 2006-03-31 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy La Paz |
| 06LAPAZ908 | EVO'S POLITICAL ADVISERS (PART 3 OF 3) | 2006-03-31 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy La Paz |
| 07SANAA473 | S) UNMANNED USG AIRCRAFT WASHES ASHORE, OFFICIAL | 2007-04-02 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Sanaa |
| 07ALGIERS652 | ALGERIANS OFFER NEARLY ALL ASSURANCES NEEDED FOR | 2007-05-13 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Algiers |
| 07LAPAZ3153 | VENEZUELA-BOLIVIA: HOW MUCH FIRE BEHIND THE SMOKE? | 2007-11-30 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy La Paz |
| 08RABAT194 | NEA A/S WELCH AND DIRECTOR GENERAL MANSOURI REVIEW | 2008-03-03 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Rabat |
| 08ALGIERS261 | ALGERIAN LEADERSHIP TOWS WESTERN SAHARA LINE WITH | 2008-03-03 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Algiers |
| 09STATE34688 | U) Secretary Clinton’s April 7, 2009 meeting | 2009-04-09 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Secretary of State |
| 09BAKU478 | IRAN VIEW FROM BAKU: VIOLENCE IN BALUCHISTAN | 2009-06-12 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Baku |
| 09ALGIERS1077 | BOUTEFLIKA TO WARD: WE WANT A STRATEGIC | 2009-12-06 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Algiers |
| 09SANAA2250 | YEMEN ABUZZ WITH TALK OF CT OPERATIONS; TTENTION SLOWLY TURNS TO U.S. ROLE | 2009-12-21 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Sanaa |
| 10SANAA45 | SALEH STICKS TO HIS CT GUNS, BUT OFFERS A WAY OUT | 2010-01-11 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Sanaa |
| 10BAGHDAD167 | PRT MUTHANNA: RENTAL SHEIKS AND LOST IRANIAN | 2010-01-22 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Baghdad |
| 10BAKU98 | IRAN: JAFARI REPORTEDLY SLAPS AHMEDINEJAD AT SNSC | 2010-02-11 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Baku |
| 10RIYADH184 | TWO FACES OF SAUDI ARABIA’S CLIMATE NEGOTIATING | 2010-02-12 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Riyadh |
| 10STATE18437 | MALDIVES AMBASSADOR’S WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS | 2010-02-26 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Secretary of State |
| 08STOCKHOLM494 | PROPOSED RESPONSE TO SWEDISH REQUEST TO RELEASE | 2008-07-09 | 2010-12-03 | SECRET | Embassy Stockholm |
Viewing cable 08STOCKHOLM494, PROPOSED RESPONSE TO SWEDISH REQUEST TO RELEASE
VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHSM #0494/01 1911414 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 091414Z JUL 08 FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3590 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 2480 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0293 RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 3150 RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0319 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 000494 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2018 TAGS: PARM MOPS MARR PREL ECON PGOV SW SUBJECT: PROPOSED RESPONSE TO SWEDISH REQUEST TO RELEASE AESA RADAR FOR GRIPEN FIGHTER PLANES REF: A. USDAO STOCKHOLM DTG 051506ZJUN2008 B. IIR 6 982 0173 Classified By: Ambassador Michael Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary ------- ¶1. (S) Embassy Stockholm recommends we postpone a response to the Swedish request for release of AESA radar for Swedish Gripens until after Norway's selection of its next fighter jet, currently slated for December 2008. In informing Sweden of this delay, we should consider offering U.S. support for the enhanced Nordic military cooperation proposals, and also consider a SecDef visit in the fall, per GOS request. End Summary. The Swedish Case for AESA ------------------------- ¶2. (S) In a June 25 meeting with the Ambassador, Minister of Defense Sten Tolgfors reviewed Sweden's arguments on the benefits to the U.S. of release of AESA radar for use on the SAAB JAS Gripen 39 fighters for the Nordic Region (refs A and B): -- AESA on Gripens would enhance NATO interoperability; -- Sweden works closely with the U.S. and NATO on security and makes important contributions through military deployments under NATO aegis in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Sweden supports a greater role for Europe in Iraq, where Sweden is opening an Embassy and recently hosted the International Compact with Iraq conference in Stockholm; -- The Gripen contains 50 percent U.S. content, including engines, avionics and weapon systems; sales of the Gripen are good for U.S. industry. AESA would increase U.S. content and enhance sales prospects; -- Sweden supports Nordic military cooperation, which moves Sweden closer to NATO. Postponing a Response on AESA ----------------------------- ¶3. (S) Our original report on AESA releaseability reviewed the Swedish case (ref A). We now supplement our recommendations to call for a postponement, taking into account the potential impact on the Norway fighter jet competition. Our recommendation for postponement is based on the following three points: -- The Swedish government has requested the granting of U.S. export licenses for Raytheon's Advanced Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar to be used on SAAB JAS Gripen 39 fighters for the Nordic Region (refs A and B), asserting that this would enhance Nordic region air coverage and interoperability. The Gripen is competing with the Lockheed Martin F35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) for a sale to Norway of 48 fighter aircraft. Norway is expected to take the decision on the Gripen vs the JSF by early December. The Gripen is also competing with the JSF and Boeing's F-18 for a later sale to Denmark of an additional 48 fighters. Swedish officials and SAAB want AESA radar in time to make the Gripen more competitive. Swedish officials tell us they anticipate a decision from Washington on AESA releaseability by September 2008. -- Given this potential impact of AESA releaseability on the Norway competition, and possibly the Denmark competition, we suggest postponing the decision on AESA releaseability for the Gripen until after Norway's decision in December. We futher recommend informing the Swedes of this delay in advance. This recommendation supplements ref A assessment of releaseability. -- If this course is chosen, we should also explore doing something else for Sweden to demonstrate our bilateral engagement and support for Nordic cooperation, while informing them of the delay. We recommend exploring offers to support aspects of the Sweden's proposals for enhanced Nordic cooperation. This is politically and economically important to all the Nordic and especially to Sweden. It is likely that many of the approximately 140 recommendations for Nordic cooperation would benefit from U.S. support and be in our interest. We propose also a favorable response to ref B request for a visit to Sweden by Secretary of Defense Gates in fall 2008. WOOD
Viewing cable 10STATE18437, MALDIVES AMBASSADOR’S WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS
VZCZCXRO4761 PP RUEHAG RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL DE RUEHC #8437/01 0572246 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 262241Z FEB 10 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 6789 INFO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 3218 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 6612 RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 2886 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 6767 RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 4427 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 9528 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2499 RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 0169 RUEHNEH/AMCONSUL HYDERABAD PRIORITY 0203 RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 7618 RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA PRIORITY 3568 RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 8840 RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 3260 RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 3444 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0551 RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0125
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 018437 SIPDIS E.O. 12958 DECL: 02/24/2020 TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PHUM, EAID, ECON, EFIN, ELAB, MARR, MASS, OEXC, OFDP, PINS, SCUL, SENV, SNAR, IMF, UN, KGHG, KDRG, MV SUBJECT: MALDIVES AMBASSADOR’S WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS Classified By: SCA A/S Robert O. Blake, Jr. reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY. Maldives Ambassador-designate (resident in New York) Abdul Ghafoor Mohamed held his first consultations in Washington February 23, ahead of his presentation of credentials to POTUS February 24. Meeting with SCA, S/SECC, S/GC, and OSD, Ghafoor said he would prioritize developing education and parliamentary exchanges during his ambassadorship; expressed confidence that Maldives would win a seat on the UN Human Rights Council; confirmed his government’s willingness to take a Guantanamo detainee; underscored the importance of tangible assistance being provided by the larger economies to small countries at the forefront of the climate change debate; and expressed appreciation for U.S. training of Maldives security personnel. He also noted his government’s interest in additional training and assistance with customs and border security and prison management. END SUMMARY. Confident on UNHRC; Keen on Educational Partnerships -------------------------------- ¶2. (C) Pre-viewing Ambassador Ghafoor’s meetings with Deputy S/SECC Pershing and S/GC Ambassador Fried, SCA A/S Robert Blake expressed appreciation to Ghafoor for Maldives’s willingness to accept a Guantanamo detainee, and President Nasheed’s strong personal effort in Copenhagen to reach an Accord. Blake also pulsed Ghafoor on Maldives’s candidacy for the Human Rights Council. Ghafoor said he was confident Maldives could get one of the four Asia Group seats; he did not think Iran, lacking Arab support, had the votes. His only concern was that Thailand and Maldives could split their votes and that Iran is working African capitals. As such, Maldives is not only lobbying Asian missions, but also African missions. Blake offered quiet U.S. assistance if it would be helpful; Ghafoor appreciated it and said Maldives might take us up on it. But Maldives needed to be seen as earning the seat in its own right. As a small country, he said, Maldives can’t play other countries against each other; it needs to take principled positions (e.g. Kosovo recognition). ¶3. (SBU) Ghafoor appreciated U.S. efforts to help push the IMF and Maldives toward agreement, but that the conditionality was “harsh.” Wage cuts have been politically difficult. Referring to the March 28-29 Maldives donors conference, Ghafoor said international assistance would help the government win over the public and implement its development program. Ghafoor said that promoting educational exchanges and partnerships between the U.S. and Maldives would offer an alternative to students who currently go to Islamic schools in Pakistan and Egypt, where they could become radicalized. A/S Blake suggested Ghafoor reach out to U.S. schools and offered assistance to help build public-private partnerships, such as, for example, a college in the hotel and restaurant management field. Ghafoor was also keen to pursue parliamentary exchanges and to receive CODELs in Maldives, as well as to promote a U.S.-Maldives caucus or friendship association in Congress. We suggested he reach out to National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute, and that we would help arrange meetings for him with Congressional staff. Ready to Assist with Detainee ----------------------------- ¶4. (S) S/GC Ambassador Daniel Fried conveyed U.S. appreciation for Maldives’s willingness to resettle a STATE 00018437 002 OF 003 Guantanamo detainee. Ghafoor said Maldives is ready to act quickly on the resettlement. Logistics remain to be worked out between the Home Ministry and the Embassy. Fried detailed those logistics, including finalizing transfer arrangements, concluding an exchange of diplomatic notes (that would include security measures), and requiring GORM permission to notify the candidate. Fried said we would keep the information close hold until we transferred the detainee; noted the offer of $85,000 to assist his resettlement expenses; and offered to make himself available for interviews should the GORM want help shaping any press messaging. Fried stressed the importance of working out more detailed security arrangements for the detainee, along the lines of those applied in other countries that have accepted Guantanamo detainees for resettlement; Embassy Colombo could work directly with the Maldivian government on those arrangements. Climate Change: Maldives Seeks Concrete Action --------------------------------------------- - ¶5. (SBU) Meeting with Deputy S/SECC Jonathan Pershing, Ghafoor referred to Copenhagen as a stepping stone toward a legally binding agreement; Maldives is prepared to accept any form of treaty/accord that would lead to concrete action. He said he saw a reluctance within the United States Congress to take action. He would like Maldivian President Nasheed to have the opportunity to speak before Congress in order to provide a sincere voice for the urgency of climate change. Pershing asked if Ghafoor had a sense of why only 105 of 192 countries had associated themselves with the Accord. Ghafoor replied that, following the commitments of the U.S., China and India at Copenhagen, and despite opposition from a small, vocal minority of countries, there had been a political shift; many countries from CARICOM, the African Union (led by Ethiopia), and AOSIS will come to associate with Copenhagen and engage on subsequent agreements. These coalitions must be coaxed and not pushed into making decisions and meeting deadlines. Pershing noted that chairmanship of organizational meetings was vital. ¶6. (SBU) Ghafoor added that Maldives would like to see that small countries, like Maldives, that are at the forefront of the climate debate, receive tangible assistance from the larger economies. Other nations would then come to realize that there are advantages to be gained by compliance. Pershing noted that Copenhagen provides a generic framework for assistance, but that the next steps are procedural. He asked about Maldivian adaptation programs. Ghafoor referred to several projects, including harbor deepening and strengthening sea walls, that are in the development stage. These projects would cost approximately $50 million. Pershing encouraged Ghafoor to provide concrete examples and specific costs in order to increase the likelihood of bilateral assistance and congressional appropriations. Ghafoor proposed that President Obama deliver a speech on climate change from Maldives when he next visits the region. He said Maldives would provide a dramatic backdrop and draw further attention to environmental challenges the islands face. Strengthening Security Cooperation ---------------------------------- ¶7. (SBU) Meeting with Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for South and Southeast Asia Robert Scher, Ghafoor expressed appreciation for the warm reception he had been receiving in Washington. He said that Maldivian soldiers and police (many now senior staff officials) that were trained by the U.S. have earned the respect of both the government and the citizens of Maldives. (NOTE: Ghafoor’s brother is a retired director of the Maldivian National Defense Force. END NOTE.) He said he looked forward to continued cooperation in this field. Scher asked how U.S. training STATE 00018437 003 OF 003 compared with that of India in terms of quantity and quality. Ghafoor said that both were substantive and substantial. He acknowledged that Maldives also interacts with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, as one might expect of a 100 percent Muslim country situated in the region. Scher indicated that the U.S. did not want to get in the way of Maldivian relationships with its neighbors. Ghafoor assessed that New Delhi’s perception of the U.S. has evolved and that Male would be able to address any concerns. He stated that his government would not let relations with India impact relations with the United States, reflecting Maldives’s attempt to “show balance” in the past. Ghafoor replied that, if necessary, Maldives would explain that neither India nor Pakistan need suspect anything “untoward.” Ghafoor also noted that young people can receive free education (in Islamic Studies) in Egypt and Pakistan. Scher asked if all of the students return to Maldives after their studies. Ghafoor said that some had been apprehended in round ups in Pakistan, where they had been recruited by extremists. He said he believed that such exposure led to a rise in fundamentalist views within Maldives’s peaceful and tolerant culture. “It used to be simply a question of faith; now you must show that you are more Muslim than others,” he said. Increased access to liberal western education would help to combat growing fundamentalist trends, he suggested. Scher pointed out that that some groups would hope to exploit this lack of education, and that it was good to hear that Maldivian authorities were actively monitoring the situation. Ghafoor acknowledged that human rights must allow for freedom of expression and said Maldives is looking for guidance on how to peaceably marry two often conflicting agendas, freedom and internal security. Scher replied that hatred is better faced head-on by a benevolent government rather than pushed underground. 8. (SBU) Ghafoor noted that drug use in Maldives has led to a rise in crime that President Nasheed has pledged to combat with prevention and rehabilitation. In the past, criminals were simply “banished” to a different island. He inquired about training assistance with management of prison facilities and the training of correctional officers. Scher pointed out that this would be a matter better addressed by State/INL, DOJ and USAID. Ghafoor noted that 99 percent of Maldives is extremely vulnerable to attack from the sea. More specifically, he said that an attack (such as by Somali pirates) on an island resort would cripple the country’s economy. Maldives is seeking additional equipment and training from the U.S. on customs and border security. Scher expressed DOD’s interest in expanding bilateral defense and security engagement, continuing training, and helping build the Maldives’s maritime security capabilities to counteract the threat from terrorism, piracy, and trafficking. CLINTON
Viewing cable 10RIYADH184, TWO FACES OF SAUDI ARABIA’S CLIMATE NEGOTIATING
VZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHRH #0184/01 0431416 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 121416Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2481 INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T RIYADH 000184 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, EEB/ESC/IEC (MONOSSON), S/CIEA (GOLDWYN, SULLIVAN), S/SECC (STERN, PERSHING, ROCHBERG) DEPT PASS TO DOE FOR JONATHAN ELKIND, JAMES HART E.O. 12958 DECL: 02/09/2020 TAGS KGHG, SENV, EPET, ENRG, PREL, SA SUBJECT: TWO FACES OF SAUDI ARABIA’S CLIMATE NEGOTIATING POSITION REF: A. 09DHAHRAN 201 B. 09RIYADH 1302 C. 09RIYADH 1397 D. 09RIYADH 1492 E. 09RIYADH 1557 F. 09RIYADH 1642 G. RIYADH 103 H. SECSTATE 3080 I. SECSTATE 11182 Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary ------- ¶1. (S) Saudi Arabia is officially still studying the issue of whether to associate with the Copenhagen Accord on Climate Change. Behind the scenes, we understand serious discussions are taking place about which road will best serve the Kingdom’s long term interests. On one hand, Saudi Arabia’s lead climate change negotiator has criticized the Copenhagen process in private and in public, arguing that the UNFCCC process is the only acceptable legal framework. On the other hand, Saudi officials are very eager to obtain investment credits for Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and other technology transfer projects that will only become available once an agreement has been reached. Saudi officials express concern about the impact a transition to a low-carbon energy mix will have on the country’s revenue stream at a time when it faces enormous financing needs to transform its economy to create jobs for its young, growing population. It also fears imposed economic costs associated with “demonizing” oil. Part of the explanation for this schizophrenic position is that the Saudi Government has not yet thought through all the implications of a climate change agreement, in part because it may not fully understand the various demand scenarios. There appears to be a growing sense within the SAG that it may be in danger of becoming isolated on climate change, which may prompt a re-examination of its position. Saudi officials have suggested that they need to find a way to climb down gracefully from the country’s tough negotiating position. More sustained engagement in coordination with other governments, particularly if pitched as an effort to develop partnership, may help them do so. End Summary. Saudi Arabia not yet Decided on Copenhagen Accord --------------------------------------------- ----- ¶2. (C) Saudi Arabia’s lead climate change negotiator Dr. Mohammad Al-Sabban told Econoffs February 3 the United States should adopt a more inclusive, transparent approach to United Nations Forum for Climate Change Cooperation (UNFCCC) negotiations. Although he was encouraged by President Obama’s attitude towards developing country partners in the negotiations, Al-Sabban said the parties needed to “learn from the mistakes” of Copenhagen in thinking about preparing for the next Conference of Parties (CoP) in Mexico. Al-Sabban said developing countries felt their Danish hosts forced them to decide on the Copenhagen Accord with practically no notice. Heads of state were also called into the negotiations too early and they applied too much pressure “when the deal was not there,” he said. In specific response to the U.S. request for support for the Copenhagen Accord (ref H), Al-Sabban said Saudi Arabia was still studying the accord to determine its position. The SAG cares about the environment, but it also must care for its citizens, he said. Addressing Saudi Economic Concerns Key to Progress --------------------------------------------- ----- ¶3. (C) Asked how to move forward on a global climate change commitment, Al-Sabban agreed negotiations need a “speedy outcome,” and said countries need to rebuild trust and confidence through more transparent negotiations. He reminisced fondly about the inclusive nature of the initial Kyoto Protocol negotiations, which he said should be replicated in Cancun. Al-Sabban said climate change negotiations should remain under the UNFCCC and not be pursued under alternative frameworks. ¶4. (C) Asked about tangible actions to reach national climate change goals, Al-Sabban said Saudi Arabia’s nationally appropriate actions would include carbon capture and storage (CCS) credits. He emphasized Saudi Arabia’s need for technology transfer and foreign direct investment to mitigate the adverse impact that emissions-reducing policies may have on the Kingdom. Al-Sabban said the SAG had closely studied climate change policies’ potential negative impacts. The Kingdom will need time to diversify its economy away from petroleum, he said, noting that a U.S. commitment to help Saudi Arabia with its economic diversification efforts would “take the pressure off climate change negotiations.” ¶5. (C) Al-Sabban said the development of renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies was key to addressing Saudi Arabia’s domestic energy demand, and he acknowledged the need for increased energy efficiency awareness. The deployment of CCS technology, he said, was “crucial” for Saudi Arabia. He said the U.S. Administration’s rhetoric to end dependence on foreign oil, reiterated by President Obama in Copenhagen, is antagonistic and causes genuine fear in Saudi Arabia. The SAG is concerned about the outlook for oil demand and global production , and fears it will not be able to diversify in time to reach its development goals. Shadow Negotiator Suggests Partnership -------------------------------------- ¶6. (C) Senior Advisor to the President of Meteorology and Environment (PME) Fawaz Al-Alamy told Econoffs January 27 the U.S. and Saudi Arabia share the same values on climate change, but have different negotiation tactics. Al-Alamy, who joined PME in late 2009 and led Saudi Arabia’s World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, said Saudi Petroleum Minister Ali Al-Naimi wants to move forward in UNFCCC negotiations. (Note: PME sends three representatives with Al-Sabban to climate change negotiations. End note.) Al-Sabban’s negative approach to negotiations “disheartens” him, as does the ongoing “blame game” on climate change. Saudi Arabia, like China and India, needs to behave like an emerging economy rather than a developing country, he said. Al-Alamy noted he had met the previous day with both the Chinese and the Indian Ambassadors to the Kingdom to discuss climate change. ¶7. (C) Al-Alamy recommended several steps for U.S. engagement with Saudi Arabia on climate change, including active outreach to all the key players including Al-Sabban, Petroleum Minister Al-Naimi, and PME President Prince Turki bin Nasser. Al-Alamy recommended the U.S. reach out to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Secretary General, who has the power to tone down the alarm in the rest of the Arab world, such as in Egypt. Al-Alamy recommended the U.S. continue to coordinate its approach with other Embassies, which he said has been very effective. Asked how to get beyond the Kyoto Protocol lens through which Al-Sabban views climate negotiations, Al-Alamy quickly replied “he only has two more years to talk about Kyoto” before it expires. ¶8. (C) Al-Alamy said that Minister of Petroleum Al-Naimi strongly supports solar energy as he believes it will displace oil currently used in the power sector and ultimately increase oil exports. Saudi Arabia currently uses 1.5 million barrels per day to produce electricity and water, he said. The Kingdom is considering beginning a civilian nuclear program, and top leadership including Minister of Foreign Affairs Saud Al-Faisal supports the increased use of renewable energy sources. Some, however, view Copenhagen as a serious threat to Saudi Arabia’s economic stability. “Ask any Saudi,” Al-Alamy said, “they all think Saudi Arabia will be asked to foot the bill for climate change.” Al-Alamy outlined Saudi Arabia’s top concerns, including its strong aversion to mixing trade and environmental priorities. If duties are placed on oil and gas, Saudi Arabia will not be able to move ahead with its economic diversification plans, and this creates a “phobia” of climate change talks, he said. The Saudis also resent the U.S. when it makes decisions “without consulting its friends.” Al-Alamy said Saudi Arabia, and Al-Sabban in particular, needs to feel like a partner of U.S. decision making. Is Al-Naimi the Problem? ------------------------ ¶9. (S) Minister Al-Naimi has consistently been rational and practical in talking with western delegations about climate change, noting that Saudi Arabia had to address its development concerns, but conceding that the world needs to work together to address climate change. These reassuring statements stand in sharp contrast to Al-Sabban’s public comments, such as questioning the science behind climate change just before Copenhagen, and his often obstructionist behavior, as reported by a number of Embassies in Riyadh, during working-level negotiations. Senior Ministry of Petroleum officials have reassured us after each of Al-Sabban’s public outbursts over the last six months that he has been “tamed” and brought back onto the reservation. The frequency and number of times that Al-Sabban steps out of line, and the apparent lack of any sanction, raises questions about the real Saudi position on climate change. ¶10. (S) A recent conversation with UK Embassy officers suggests that indeed Al-Naimi may have some questions about climate change. They report that Al-Naimi was sharply critical of the Copenhagen meetings and the climate change effort in general, in marked contrast to earlier meetings. He complained that heads of state were brought in to negotiate the final stages, which prevented Saudi Arabia from voicing its true opposition to several elements. He also questioned the legality of the Copenhagen process and its future direction.
Viewing cable 10BAKU98, IRAN: JAFARI REPORTEDLY SLAPS AHMEDINEJAD AT SNSC
VZCZCXYZ0001 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHKB #0098 0421023 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 111023Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY BAKU TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2384 INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T BAKU 000098 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2020 TAGS: PGOV PARM PHUM AJ IR SUBJECT: IRAN: JAFARI REPORTEDLY SLAPS AHMEDINEJAD AT SNSC MEETING; TUDEH RE-EMERGING? REF: A. A) 2009 BAKU 972 ¶B. B) 2009 BAKU 921 ¶C. C) 2009 BAKU 920 (NOTAL) d. D) 2009 BAKU 909 Classified By: xxxxx for Reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (S) Baku Iran watcher met with xxxxx (strictly protect - see reftels). He who Got Slapped ------------------ ¶2. (S) According to source, President Ahmedinejad surprised other SNSC members by taking a surprisingly liberal posture during a mid January post-Ashura meeting of the SNSC called to discuss next steps on dealing with opposition protests. Source said that Ahmedinejad claimed that "people feel suffocated," and mused that to defuse the situation it may be necessary to allow more personal and social freedoms, including more freedom of the press. ¶3. (S) According to source, Ahmedinejad's statements infuriated Revolutionary Guard Chief of Staff Mohammed Ali Jafari, who exclaimed "You are wrong! (In fact) it is YOU who created this mess! And now you say give more freedom to the press?!" Source said that Jafarli then slapped Ahmedinejad in the face, causing an uproar and an immediate call for a break in the meeting, which was never resumed. Source said that SNSC did not meet again for another two weeks, after Ayatollah Janati succesfully acted as a "peacemaker" between Jafarli and Ahmedinejad. Source added that the break in the SNSC meeting, but not the slap that caused it, has made its way on to some Iranian blogs. Sides Preparing for New Confrontations -------------------------------------- ¶4. (S) Meanwhile, source said, both sides are digging in for new confrontations, while various sub-groups maneuver. He stressed the importance of recent speeches by Karroubi and Khatami to the effect that Ahmedinejad will not be able finish his term, and that Supreme Leaders should not take partisan political sides. He stressed that "Karroubi chooses each word carefully," and aid the recent speeches reflect an ongoing effort to split Khameini from the Ahmedinejad group. Source described the overall political situation within and without the political elite as "getting worse and worse." xxxxx opined that this situation (of protests and instability) cannot be sustained indefinitely, and predicted that events are trending towards major developments and a new phases. Asked what Iran will likely look like over the next year, he responded "ask me after 22 Bahman (February 11)." Tudeh Acticsts Re-Emerging? -------------------------- ¶5. (S) Source (a former non-Marxist revolutionary activist) also asserted that the Iranian Tudeh (communist) party is reorganizing among factory and government workers, and intellectuals. He claimed that many former Tudeh sympathizers hold positions in the bureaucracy and elsewhere, and opined that many still privately support the movement. He mentioned one xxxxx organizer who has re-emerged behind the scenes of recent bus worker and other labor strikes. Lu
Viewing cable 10BAGHDAD167, PRT MUTHANNA: RENTAL SHEIKS AND LOST IRANIAN
VZCZCXYZ0018 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHGB #0167/01 0221650 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 221650Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6243 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000167 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2020 TAGS: PGOV KISL KCOR SUBJECT: PRT MUTHANNA: RENTAL SHEIKS AND LOST IRANIAN WEEKENDS REF: A. 08 BAGHDAD 3492 ¶B. 08 BAGHDAD 3654 Classified By: xxxxx for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ) ¶1. (U) This is a xxxxx reporting cable. ¶2. (S) SUMMARY: xxxxx met with local leader Sheikh xxxxx. During our lengthy discussions the Sheikh shared his belief that the USG has poorly utilized its influence in Iraq, leaving the way open for Iran to advance its agenda at USG expense. He went on to describe Iranian government attempts to buy his influence on a recent trip he made to Iran. End Summary. A new twist on &what happens in vegas, stays in vegas8 --------------------------------------------- --------- ¶3. (S) Sheikh xxxxx on January 13 to discuss his recent trip to Iran. He told the xxxxx that he has been courted by Iranian officials in an effort to garner more support and influence among well-placed Iraqis in the middle Euphrates area. He noted that the &handler8 for the tribal leaders in this area is xxxxx, who has long family ties locally. ¶4. (S) The public reason for xxxxx trip to Tehran was for a medical check-up. He privately told xxxxx that his trip was more for pleasure than medical treatment and included one or more short-term &marriages8 (i.e. with state-sanctioned prostitutes) and other entertainment. xxxxx shared that other (unnamed) tribal leaders had enjoyed similar privileges while guests of the Iranian regime recently. Dashed expectations ------------------- ¶5. (S) The Sheikh suggested that some Iraqi figures are more susceptible to Iranian influence because of disillusionment with the United States. During the meeting with xxxxx asked repeatedly, &Why have the Americans let us down?8 After he and other tribal sheikhs visited the White House and met then-President Bush in 2008, he expected to benefit financially from the Americans. Instead, he suggested that the Americans did nothing for him, even after he reported on Iranian activities in Muthanna (Ref A). &The United States did not secure their friends, the sheikhs, financially, and has left them vulnerable to Iranian temptations.8 ¶6. (S) xxxxx also complained that while tribal leaders in fairly stable areas used their influence to help minimize insurgent activities over the past several years, they have received nothing for their efforts. Cooperative sheikhs in insurgent hotbeds like Anbar, in contrast, received benefits from the Americans. xxxxx cited Abu Risha as an example, noting he received money, projects, and other perquisites for his cooperation. He finished by noting that several of the White House-invited tribal leaders have been quietly grumbling. He states that he has had conversations on this perceived inequity with parliamentarian xxxxx from Diwaniyah. ¶7. (S) Additionally, xxxxx was frustrated with the current regime in Baghdad. He stated that the United States' support of the Maliki government has only increased Iran's influence in Iraq, enabling operatives to influence political decisions and diminish national sovereignty. The Iraqi government has not made progress in fighting poverty, it has failed to provide essential services, and it is full of corruption. He asked if the United States is supporting Iran. &Why? Because you have American troops on the ground, but you are advancing Iranian interests without costing them anything.8 Comment ------- ¶8. (S) PRT COMMENT: Southern Iraqi sheikhs are well known Q8. (S) PRT COMMENT: Southern Iraqi sheikhs are well known for shifting their loyalties based on financial considerations. PM Maliki's Isnad/Tribal Support Councils are particularly noteworthy in this regard. Susceptible sheikhs will trade their influence for financial support especially if the sheikh is not independently wealthy. (Note: xxxxx and does not independently enjoy a large bankroll. End note.) In turn, the sheikh can mobilize supporters, when needed (e.g. Ref B). The influence, however, is rented and not bought. If the financial contributions suddenly stop, much of the support may also cease. xxxxx considers this true for Iranian influence in the region as well. If Iran continues to pay for support among influential sheikhs, the Islamic Republic will likely increase its influence. If and when the money dries up, so will the cooperation among these rented sheikhs. End Comment. Hill
Viewing cable 10SANAA45, SALEH STICKS TO HIS CT GUNS, BUT OFFERS A WAY OUT
VZCZCXYZ0003 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHYN #0045/01 0111405 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 111405Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY SANAA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3515 INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SANAA 000045 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND OPS CENTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2020 TAGS: PTER PGOV YM SUBJECT: SALEH STICKS TO HIS CT GUNS, BUT OFFERS A WAY OUT TO AQAP RANK AND FILE REF: A. SANAA 0014 ¶B. 09 SANAA 1299 Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY. After several successful counter-terrorism operations aimed at uprooting an entrenched al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), President Saleh announced on January 9 that he was willing to negotiate with AQAP members who renounced violence, signaling a return to one of the tactics Saleh has used previously to control the wide spectrum of Islamic extremists in Yemen. With a variety of domestic actors ) from conservative clerics to the political opposition and the tribes - protesting the ROYG's recent strikes against AQAP, Saleh is feeling pressure to shore up his domestic political base by offering the possibility of a softer approach to AQAP's lower-ranking membership. He has not, however, shied away from his commitment to go after al-Qaeda's top leadership, which he understands is unlikely to either renounce terrorism or agree to negotiate with the ROYG, especially after a series of sweeping CT operations in December and January. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S) During a January 9 interview with Abu Dhabi TV, President Saleh said that while he was willing to negotiate with members of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) who were willing to renounce violence, he would continue to pursue to the best of his abilities those who continued to engage in terrorism. "Dialogue is the best way ) even with al-Qaeda, if they set aside their weapons and return to reason," he said. Official news outlets, including 26 September, al-Jamhurriya, and al-Mutamar, reprinted the complete text of the interview on January 10, signaling the government's official endorsement of the president's comment. (Note: The interview echoes his January 1 editorial in official al-Thawra newspaper, in which he called for the Houthis and AQAP to renounce violence and embrace dialogue with the government as well as his December 14 call for a National Dialogue to include a variety of societal actors (Ref A). End Note.) ¶3. (S) xxxxx told PolOff on January 11 he was surprised at the president's openness in offering to talk to members of al-Qaeda, but that the ROYG has a history of dialogue through the rehabilitation program for "reformed" extremists. (Note: In the past, Minister of Religious Endowments Judge Hamoud Hitar ran a now-defunct rehabilitation program for religious extremists based on dialogue. End Note.) Saleh is known for negotiating with his domestic opponents, including al-Qaeda. For years, he has negotiated with, exploited, bribed and cajoled Islamic extremists in Yemen for his own political gain (Ref B). Even officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), including Head of the North America Department Adil al-Sunaini, acknowledged that negotiating with AQAP is an "old government policy." "Our good president says things to play the old game and keep everyone under his thumb,"xxxxx told PolOff on January ¶11. (Comment: Despite a history of negotiating with al-Qaeda, Saleh's current offer of dialogue to AQAP members who renounce violence is unlikely to apply to the group's hardened leadership. Instead, the president is likely appealing to his religious base by offering an "out" to the organization's rank and file, who, after a series of punitive operations against AQAP in December and January, might be looking for just such an opportunity. End Comment.) ¶4. (S) Saleh's remarks come after three weeks of public criticism of the ROYG's close CT cooperation with the U.S. - and specifically a December 17 airstrike in Abyan governorate - from a variety of domestic actors, including religious clerics, tribal leaders and the political opposition. One of the most significant challenges has come from the conservative religious establisment. In a January 8 Friday sermon, conservative Salafi cleric and powerful Islah member Abdulmajid al-Zindani railed against Yemen's CT cooperation with the U.S., accusing it of wanting to "occupy" Yemen, according to local press reports. Dubai-based al-Arabiya reported on January 11 that influential Aden-based Salafi cleric Ali Mohammed Umar said his followers would fight with AQAP against any American intervention in Yemen. "The president's two pillars of support are the military and the Salafis. These comments were for the Salafis," xxxxx said. xxxxx, told PolOff on January 11, "Do not give these remarks too much care. It is just a media statement." xxxxx pointed out that the remarks, made in Arabic on a Middle Eastern satellite TV channel, were intended for domestic - not Western - consumption. xxxxx, told EmbOff on January 11 thatxxxxx on the president's remarks because they were "not to be taken seriously." Comment ------- ¶5. (S) While Saleh's remarks reflect a need to appease certain domestic constituencies upset by close cooperation with the U.S. against AQAP, he has not given any indications of shying away from future operations against AQAP leadership. In the same interview, Saleh said that terrorists are a "danger not just to Yemen,s security but to international security, especially al-Qaeda." While the president likes to keep all options on the table and never writes off the possibility of negotiations with any political opponent, his current offer is likely to apply to AQAP's rank and file - not its hardened, isolated and hunted leadership. In Yemen, especially, actions speak louder than words, and Saleh's actions have not yet wavered in uprooting al-Qaeda. End comment. Seche
Viewing cable 09SANAA2250, YEMEN ABUZZ WITH TALK OF CT OPERATIONS; TTENTION SLOWLY TURNS TO U.S. ROLE
VZCZCXYZ0001 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHYN #2250/01 3551328 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 211328Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY SANAA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3425 INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
SECRET SANAA 002250 SIPDIS FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR JYAPHE NSC FOR AJOST E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019 TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL MOPS MASS YM SUBJECT: YEMEN ABUZZ WITH TALK OF CT OPERATIONS; TTENTION SLOWLY TURNS TO U.S. ROLE Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY. Yemenis have talked of little else but the counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula since news broke of the pre-dawn raids on December ¶17. Official media and ROYG officials have focused on the successful aspects of the operation, including an alleged 34 terrorists killed and 51 arrested. Independent and opposition media as well as the opposition Joint Meeting Parties and members of the Southern Movement have used the operations ) specifically the deadly airstrikes in Abyan governorate ) to criticize what they view as the ROYG's heavy-handed policies. After a series of stories on U.S. involvement broke in the U.S. media in the days after the strikes, local and pan-Arab media have begun to focus on this aspect of the story. ROYG media reported the conversation between President Obama and President Saleh and released an official statement that there was no U.S. military involvement in the raids. While President Saleh and the ROYG seem determined to move forward with similar strikes in the future (septel), still-nascent public support will depend on the ROYG's ability to effectively manage the evolving coverage of the events. END SUMMARY. Heavy media coverage along partisan lines ----------------------------------------- ¶2. (C) The ROYG made swift work of announcing the preemptive dawn strikes against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Sana'a and Abyan governorates on December 17. But ABC TV news reports of U.S. intelligence and logistical assistance to the ROYG were picked up on the same day by Yemen's opposition media, and were quickly followed by charges of scores of civilian deaths due to the "joint" airstrikes in Abyan by ROYG and U.S. forces. Opposition demonstrators and media outlets, as well as members of Parliament, have called for an investigation of the civilian deaths in Abyan due to the airstrikes. The story, heavily reported in the international press, of an extensive role by U.S. counter-terrorism forces in assisting the ROYG will linger as long as interest in the civilian deaths continues. ¶3. (C) Raids against AQAP at dawn on December 17 in Arhab (a suburb of Sanaa) and a training camp located in a village in Abyan's al-Mahfad district were reported immediately by the Ministry of Defense Web site 26sep.com and picked up by local and international media by noon on December 17. Reports of U.S. logistical and intelligence assistance to ROYG counter-terrorism forces were reported on ABC TV later the same day. That TV broadcast was swiftly reported on the opposition Islah party's Web site, al-Sahwa, repeating assertions of U.S. assistance to the ROYG, and citing unnamed eyewitnesses claiming that 18 children and 41 men and women were among the civilians killed by airstrikes. Also on December 17, al-Jazeera aired footage of civilian casualties and quoted locals as saying that U.S. aircraft were sighted on overflight surveillance on the eve of the airstrikes in Abyan. The official media was slow to respond to rapid coverage critical of the raids by opposition media and to organized protests in the region, instead focusing its initial reporting on AQAP leaders killed or captured in the raids. Official media defends strikes, denies u.s. Involvement --------------------------------------------- ---------- ¶4. (SBU) By December 18, the regional and international media, led by the report in the New York Times that the U.S. had given intelligence, firepower and other assistance to the ROYG in their raids against AQAP, began to cover the question of U.S. involvement. The sensationalist and often inaccurate Almenpar.net, the Houthis' official Web site, and Iran's PressTV.net both reported 63 people dead in the raids in Abyan, including 28 children. On December 19, the ROYG went on the offensive, reporting on the MOD's Web site that operations against AQAP militants were targeted to foil suicide bombers planning attacks against Yemeni and foreign installations, that the raids resulted in killing four suicide bombers and arresting four others, and that the attack on the training center in Abyan resulted in the deaths of 24-30 AQAP members. Al-Jazeera, meanwhile, broadcast a report on December 19 that the number killed in Abyan was over 60, according to eyewitnesses, and that most of the deaths were civilians. The satellite channel also showed video of artillery shells with visible serial numbers and claimed that "U.S. warplanes or cruise missiles probably conducted the strike." On December 21, official media attempted to get the damaging story of civilian deaths off the front pages by diverting focus to the war in Sa'ada. Elites react with reserve, some praise -------------------------------------- ¶5. (S) Gauging public opinion on the December 17 CT strikes is difficult since the majority of Yemen's population is rural and no national polling systems exist. The political elite as represented by Embassy contacts, however, have generally reacted with reserve, and some have even offered praise for "long-overdue" action. In an e-mail to EmbOffs, xxxxx congratulated the USG on the successful CT operations, which he praised as necessary to rid Yemen of terrorist elements. xxxxx, told PolOff that the strikes were necessary to bring Abyan back from the edge of extremism. "Al-Qaeda travels freely throughout Abyan and Shebwa, using their training camps. They now number in the thousands in these areas," he said. Criticism among the elite classes has so far been limited to loss of civilian life and largely avoided any criticism of the U.S. xxxxx to PolOff on December 20, "We do not support religious, ideological or political extremism, but to use military violence that kills innocents on the pretext of pursuing criminals is wrong." xxxxx often critical of ROYG policies - told PolOff on December 18 that he perceived the operations as successful, but wished the Arhab operation had netted the "big fish," AQAP Operational Commander Qassim al-Rimi, which would have provided a better justification for any civilian losses. Opposition hits back, citing civilian deaths -------------------------------------------- ¶6. (S) Members of the opposition Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), Parliament and the Southern Movement have all used the airstrikes in Abyan as a means to attack the ROYG for what the oppositionists call heavy-handed policies. The strike in Maajala in Abyan's al-Mahfad district, which locals have reported killed 49 "civilians" (including 17 women and 23 children), comes on the heels of a critical and widely read Human Rights Watch report focused on the ROYG's violent suppression of political demonstrations in the southern governorates released on December 15. (Note: Deputy Prime Minister for Defense and Security Affairs Rashad al-Alimi told the Ambassador that civilians killed in the airstrikes were most likely poor Bedouin from the area providing logistical support to the terrorists and AQAP family members. End Note.) Non-stop al-Jazeera coverage of the aftermath of attacks in Abyan has provided fuel for the opposition. On December 20, Parliament, led by opposition Islah party member from Abyan Ali al-Ashal, called Alimi and the Minister of Defense to appear before the legislative body to discuss reports of civilian deaths in Abyan. ¶7. (S) The JMP immediately seized on reports of civilian deaths, using the December 17 airstrikes as an excuse not to participate in President Saleh's National Dialogue, set to begin on December 26. The Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) called for the ROYG to compensate victims' families and pay for treatment of those wounded in the operations. Local media reported that "thousands" protested in the perpetually restive southern governorates of Lahj and Abyan, calling for an investigation into the attacks. Rumors were rampant among secessionists in southern Yemen that the attack did not target an AQAP training camp, but rather a civilian population. xxxxx the airstrikes in Abyan as another occasion to promote the movement as a better CT partner for the U.S. than the ROYG. He told PolOff on December 20, "The Saleh regime is trying to mix up al-Qaeda with the movement. We're willing to cooperate with you to avoid killing innocent people and kick out al-Qaeda." Royg frustrated, but willing to stay the course --------------------------------------------- -- ¶8. (S) The ROYG has weathered the storm of criticism ) most of it from the usual suspects ) well, and has restated its commitment to continue similar operations against AQAP in the near future. Alimi, speaking for President Saleh, told the Ambassador on December 20 that his government was determined to keep hitting AQAP in cooperation with the U.S. (septel). Political observers in Sana'a have suggested that President Saleh received a significant morale boost from personal, congratulatory phone calls from President Obama and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak the day of the strikes. A weary-sounding xxxxx, "The attack is already causing the government a headache because the JMP is using it as the reason not to participate in the National Dialogue," which will include economic as well as political issues. However, the ROYG ) often eager to use flack from the opposition as an excuse not to move forward in controversial CT operations ) has indicated that it is willing to weather the most recent criticism. Comment ------- ¶9. (S) The December 17 operations against AQAP have proven a success and served as a significant distraction in the local media from the government's protracted civil war in the north of the country. In Sana'a at least, many Yemenis seem to accept the necessity and inevitability of similar CT action as al-Qaeda's presence in Yemen's lawless tribal governorates has ballooned in recent months. The ROYG, however, must be more proactive in countering inaccurate opposition stories and AQAP propaganda regarding the loss of innocent lives in the Abyan airstrikes, especially if future operations are already in the works. While the U.S. has escaped the brunt of criticism to date, continued leaks from Washington and international media coverage of American involvement could stir up anti-American resentment in Yemen and test the ROYG's professed commitment to going after AQAP. END COMMENT. Seche
Viewing cable 09SANAA2250, YEMEN ABUZZ WITH TALK OF CT OPERATIONS; TTENTION SLOWLY TURNS TO U.S. ROLE
VZCZCXYZ0001 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHYN #2250/01 3551328 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 211328Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY SANAA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3425 INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
SECRET SANAA 002250 SIPDIS FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR JYAPHE NSC FOR AJOST E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019 TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL MOPS MASS YM SUBJECT: YEMEN ABUZZ WITH TALK OF CT OPERATIONS; TTENTION SLOWLY TURNS TO U.S. ROLE Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY. Yemenis have talked of little else but the counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula since news broke of the pre-dawn raids on December ¶17. Official media and ROYG officials have focused on the successful aspects of the operation, including an alleged 34 terrorists killed and 51 arrested. Independent and opposition media as well as the opposition Joint Meeting Parties and members of the Southern Movement have used the operations ) specifically the deadly airstrikes in Abyan governorate ) to criticize what they view as the ROYG's heavy-handed policies. After a series of stories on U.S. involvement broke in the U.S. media in the days after the strikes, local and pan-Arab media have begun to focus on this aspect of the story. ROYG media reported the conversation between President Obama and President Saleh and released an official statement that there was no U.S. military involvement in the raids. While President Saleh and the ROYG seem determined to move forward with similar strikes in the future (septel), still-nascent public support will depend on the ROYG's ability to effectively manage the evolving coverage of the events. END SUMMARY. Heavy media coverage along partisan lines ----------------------------------------- ¶2. (C) The ROYG made swift work of announcing the preemptive dawn strikes against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Sana'a and Abyan governorates on December 17. But ABC TV news reports of U.S. intelligence and logistical assistance to the ROYG were picked up on the same day by Yemen's opposition media, and were quickly followed by charges of scores of civilian deaths due to the "joint" airstrikes in Abyan by ROYG and U.S. forces. Opposition demonstrators and media outlets, as well as members of Parliament, have called for an investigation of the civilian deaths in Abyan due to the airstrikes. The story, heavily reported in the international press, of an extensive role by U.S. counter-terrorism forces in assisting the ROYG will linger as long as interest in the civilian deaths continues. ¶3. (C) Raids against AQAP at dawn on December 17 in Arhab (a suburb of Sanaa) and a training camp located in a village in Abyan's al-Mahfad district were reported immediately by the Ministry of Defense Web site 26sep.com and picked up by local and international media by noon on December 17. Reports of U.S. logistical and intelligence assistance to ROYG counter-terrorism forces were reported on ABC TV later the same day. That TV broadcast was swiftly reported on the opposition Islah party's Web site, al-Sahwa, repeating assertions of U.S. assistance to the ROYG, and citing unnamed eyewitnesses claiming that 18 children and 41 men and women were among the civilians killed by airstrikes. Also on December 17, al-Jazeera aired footage of civilian casualties and quoted locals as saying that U.S. aircraft were sighted on overflight surveillance on the eve of the airstrikes in Abyan. The official media was slow to respond to rapid coverage critical of the raids by opposition media and to organized protests in the region, instead focusing its initial reporting on AQAP leaders killed or captured in the raids. Official media defends strikes, denies u.s. Involvement --------------------------------------------- ---------- ¶4. (SBU) By December 18, the regional and international media, led by the report in the New York Times that the U.S. had given intelligence, firepower and other assistance to the ROYG in their raids against AQAP, began to cover the question of U.S. involvement. The sensationalist and often inaccurate Almenpar.net, the Houthis' official Web site, and Iran's PressTV.net both reported 63 people dead in the raids in Abyan, including 28 children. On December 19, the ROYG went on the offensive, reporting on the MOD's Web site that operations against AQAP militants were targeted to foil suicide bombers planning attacks against Yemeni and foreign installations, that the raids resulted in killing four suicide bombers and arresting four others, and that the attack on the training center in Abyan resulted in the deaths of 24-30 AQAP members. Al-Jazeera, meanwhile, broadcast a report on December 19 that the number killed in Abyan was over 60, according to eyewitnesses, and that most of the deaths were civilians. The satellite channel also showed video of artillery shells with visible serial numbers and claimed that "U.S. warplanes or cruise missiles probably conducted the strike." On December 21, official media attempted to get the damaging story of civilian deaths off the front pages by diverting focus to the war in Sa'ada. Elites react with reserve, some praise -------------------------------------- ¶5. (S) Gauging public opinion on the December 17 CT strikes is difficult since the majority of Yemen's population is rural and no national polling systems exist. The political elite as represented by Embassy contacts, however, have generally reacted with reserve, and some have even offered praise for "long-overdue" action. In an e-mail to EmbOffs, xxxxx congratulated the USG on the successful CT operations, which he praised as necessary to rid Yemen of terrorist elements. xxxxx, told PolOff that the strikes were necessary to bring Abyan back from the edge of extremism. "Al-Qaeda travels freely throughout Abyan and Shebwa, using their training camps. They now number in the thousands in these areas," he said. Criticism among the elite classes has so far been limited to loss of civilian life and largely avoided any criticism of the U.S. xxxxx to PolOff on December 20, "We do not support religious, ideological or political extremism, but to use military violence that kills innocents on the pretext of pursuing criminals is wrong." xxxxx often critical of ROYG policies - told PolOff on December 18 that he perceived the operations as successful, but wished the Arhab operation had netted the "big fish," AQAP Operational Commander Qassim al-Rimi, which would have provided a better justification for any civilian losses. Opposition hits back, citing civilian deaths -------------------------------------------- ¶6. (S) Members of the opposition Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), Parliament and the Southern Movement have all used the airstrikes in Abyan as a means to attack the ROYG for what the oppositionists call heavy-handed policies. The strike in Maajala in Abyan's al-Mahfad district, which locals have reported killed 49 "civilians" (including 17 women and 23 children), comes on the heels of a critical and widely read Human Rights Watch report focused on the ROYG's violent suppression of political demonstrations in the southern governorates released on December 15. (Note: Deputy Prime Minister for Defense and Security Affairs Rashad al-Alimi told the Ambassador that civilians killed in the airstrikes were most likely poor Bedouin from the area providing logistical support to the terrorists and AQAP family members. End Note.) Non-stop al-Jazeera coverage of the aftermath of attacks in Abyan has provided fuel for the opposition. On December 20, Parliament, led by opposition Islah party member from Abyan Ali al-Ashal, called Alimi and the Minister of Defense to appear before the legislative body to discuss reports of civilian deaths in Abyan. ¶7. (S) The JMP immediately seized on reports of civilian deaths, using the December 17 airstrikes as an excuse not to participate in President Saleh's National Dialogue, set to begin on December 26. The Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) called for the ROYG to compensate victims' families and pay for treatment of those wounded in the operations. Local media reported that "thousands" protested in the perpetually restive southern governorates of Lahj and Abyan, calling for an investigation into the attacks. Rumors were rampant among secessionists in southern Yemen that the attack did not target an AQAP training camp, but rather a civilian population. xxxxx the airstrikes in Abyan as another occasion to promote the movement as a better CT partner for the U.S. than the ROYG. He told PolOff on December 20, "The Saleh regime is trying to mix up al-Qaeda with the movement. We're willing to cooperate with you to avoid killing innocent people and kick out al-Qaeda." Royg frustrated, but willing to stay the course --------------------------------------------- -- ¶8. (S) The ROYG has weathered the storm of criticism ) most of it from the usual suspects ) well, and has restated its commitment to continue similar operations against AQAP in the near future. Alimi, speaking for President Saleh, told the Ambassador on December 20 that his government was determined to keep hitting AQAP in cooperation with the U.S. (septel). Political observers in Sana'a have suggested that President Saleh received a significant morale boost from personal, congratulatory phone calls from President Obama and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak the day of the strikes. A weary-sounding xxxxx, "The attack is already causing the government a headache because the JMP is using it as the reason not to participate in the National Dialogue," which will include economic as well as political issues. However, the ROYG ) often eager to use flack from the opposition as an excuse not to move forward in controversial CT operations ) has indicated that it is willing to weather the most recent criticism. Comment ------- ¶9. (S) The December 17 operations against AQAP have proven a success and served as a significant distraction in the local media from the government's protracted civil war in the north of the country. In Sana'a at least, many Yemenis seem to accept the necessity and inevitability of similar CT action as al-Qaeda's presence in Yemen's lawless tribal governorates has ballooned in recent months. The ROYG, however, must be more proactive in countering inaccurate opposition stories and AQAP propaganda regarding the loss of innocent lives in the Abyan airstrikes, especially if future operations are already in the works. While the U.S. has escaped the brunt of criticism to date, continued leaks from Washington and international media coverage of American involvement could stir up anti-American resentment in Yemen and test the ROYG's professed commitment to going after AQAP. END COMMENT. Seche
Viewing cable 09ALGIERS1077, BOUTEFLIKA TO WARD: WE WANT A STRATEGIC
VZCZCXYZ0001 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHAS #1077/01 3400757 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 060757Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8190 INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO IMMEDIATE 1048 RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY IMMEDIATE 1989 RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE 6814 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 1259
S E C R E T ALGIERS 001077 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PBTS KPAL KWBG US IR IZ IS AF, XA SUBJECT: BOUTEFLIKA TO WARD: WE WANT A STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. William Jordan; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary ------- ¶1. (C) U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander General William Ward met Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika November 25, during Ward's first visit to Algeria since assuming command of AFRICOM. Ward said AFRICOM's strategy was to assist African nations in providing for their own security needs, not do the job for them. The U.S. recognized Algeria's leadership in the region, and AFRICOM was prepared to assist Algeria and its neighbors combat terrorism. Bouteflika said Algeria wanted to be a strategic partner, not an adversary. Our military relationship already included training and technical cooperation. End-use-monitoring requirements infringed on Algeria's national sovereignty and therefore imposed some limits on military engagement. But the U.S. and Algeria shared a common goal in combating terrorism. Terrorism in the region had taken a dangerous form, and Sahel countries were prepared to address the problem jointly. More needed to be done to ensure the participation and commitment of Mali's political leadership in the regional struggle. Bouteflika told Ward the Malian president needed to understand he could not be friends with both the thieves and their victims at the same time. Trans-Sahara heads of state still planned to convene a security and development summit in Bamako but had yet to set a firm date. Bouteflika also reviewed Egyptian-Algerian tensions in the aftermath of a World Cup qualifying match, Western Sahara, the negative repercussions of Israeli settlement activities, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. On the soccer issue, he made a point of telling Ward that the king of Morocco -- in contrast to the strain with Egypt -- had sent him a very warm congratulatory message after the game. At the end of the meeting, Bouteflika invited Ward to return to Algeria in the near future. End summary. Addressing Common Challenges ---------------------------- ¶2. (C) Visiting Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander General William Ward met with Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika November 25 at the presidential residence. With Bouteflika were Chief of Staff of the Algerian National Popular Army (ANP) Lieutenant General Ahmed Gaid-Salah, Ministry of National Defense (MND) Director of External Relations and Cooperation General Nourredine Mekri, ANP Chief of Organization and Logistics Major General Abdelhamid Ghriss and a translator. The Ambassador, General Ward's foreign policy advisor, Dr. Raymond Brown, the DATT and Poloff (notetaker) accompanied General Ward to the meeting, which lasted two hours. Ward emphasized that his visit to Algiers was symbolic of our countries' growing bilateral relationship. Africa Command's mission was to assist African nations address their own security challenges, not to do it for them. The purpose of his visit, Ward said, was to listen to Algeria's perspective on enhancing our cooperation as we seek ways to work together to address common challenges in Africa. Ward recognized that these challenges were complex and required development and political solutions, not just military intervention. Going forward, we sought to cooperate in areas that Algeria determines are priorities. AFRICOM welcomed the regional counterterrorism efforts Algeria has engaged in with neighboring Sahel countries. Algeria is leading the effort; we will work with Algeria and its neighbors to assist in eliminating the terrorist threat in the region. ¶3. (C) President Bouteflika said that the United States and Algeria shared a common objective and the will to work cooperatively in the fight against terrorism. Bouteflika noted the U.S. and Algeria started to work more closely together during the Clinton administration when both sides came to realize they were fighting the same problem. Bouteflika underscored that after 9/11, Algeria was the first Arab and Muslim country to send a message of solidarity to President Bush. Subsequently, despite the unpopularity of some Bush policies, political and economic relations between our countries improved. Today, relations were excellent, he said, noting that Algeria was the United States' second largest trading partner in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia and our largest trading partner in Africa. President Obama's new approach to U.S. foreign policy was "a breath of fresh air" and well regarded by developing world countries. But this meant there were also high expectations for his administration. Bouteflika predicted that our bilateral relationship would continue in a positive direction. He commented that the U.S. and Algeria were moving forward with cooperation, recognizing the value of dialogue across all leadership levels. In this regard, Bouteflika declared he was ready to assist Ward and invited him to visit Algeria again. Military Cooperation -------------------- ¶4. (S) Bouteflika attached importance to Algeria's military-military cooperation with the United States but noted that U.S. end-use monitoring requirements contravened Algeria's national sovereignty. Nonetheless, we had made progress on training and technical cooperation. Bouteflika said the capabilities of U.S. and Algerian forces were well understood in the region. Bouteflika argued that frank, direct talks were the key to a successful military dialogue, as well as recognizing that, in some cases, there would be limits on the extent of cooperation. "Tell us what you want, and we will tell you what we can do." Algeria, he continued, wanted to be a strategic partner for the U.S. in the region, not an adversary. ¶5. (S) General Ward thanked Bouteflika for his candid assessment of our mil-mil relationship. He said the President, secretaries of State and Defense, and US Joint Chiefs of Staff, all recognized the value of the US-Algeria partnership. Bouteflika responded that he would help us to consolidate that partnership. Ward argued that to enhance our partnership, Algeria needed to tell us how we can contribute best to achieve mutual objectives. Despite the bad things sometimes said about AFRICOM, Ward said with a smile, his command had not been created to take over Africa. Without missing a beat, Bouteflika replied with an even bigger smile that he had been unsure about this himself until Ward came. Ward said that, as we continue our military dialogue, we want to do the things Algeria tells us are important. Ward affirmed Algeria had long recognized the challenge of extremism and demonstrated its ability to fight back. AFRICOM would do its part to support Algeria and its neighbors in this effort. Addressing Bouteflika's point on end-use-monitoring requirements, Ward suggested focusing our efforts in areas where cooperation was possible, i.e., training and equipping. He acknowledged that some U.S. laws and regulations may preclude for now Algeria's participation in other forms of engagement. Civil-Military Relations ------------------------ ¶6. (S) Bouteflika underscored that Algeria's military "absolutely" respected the authority of civilian leadership. "This is not at all like Turkey," he said. Bouteflika asserted that the army was forced to take drastic measures during the violence of the 1990s in order to save the country. This was a difficult period, but constitutional rule had been restored. "The house is now in order," he stressed, "and I can tell you that the army obeys the civilians. There is one constitution and all obey it." Bouteflika acknowledged, however, that the problems of the past still haunted the country. He cited foreign press reports referring to Algeria as a dictatorship and argued that the term was sometimes used carelessly. The Algerian constitution had established the rule of law. In 2004 it was decided that there was no more historical "revolutionary legitimacy". The only legitimacy was the constitution. "Anyone can be a candidate for election, in accordance with the constitution, even a general." He paused, then grinned and said, "but the generals realize the difficulties and none has been a candidate yet." Counterterrorism ---------------- ¶7. (C) Bouteflika said terrorism in Africa had taken a dangerous form. The situation in Somalia was hopeless, he commented. Meanwhile, the Sahel region presented a complex set of issues. Fortunately, most Sahel countries were determined to cooperate and have the capability to fight the threat if they work together. Mauritania expressed a clear commitment as did Niger, although Bouteflika recognized U.S. concerns with President Tandja. Mali's full cooperation remained elusive, however. Mali's policies have failed to create stability in the north. The result is a lawless environment in which smuggling, along with arms and drug trafficking, enable terrorism. Bouteflika said the region was prepared to tackle this problem, and bilateral and regional efforts were already underway. In this regard, Algeria was closely monitoring U.S. military assistance to Mali and Niger. ¶8. (S) Ward told Bouteflika that he planned to visit Bamako after Algiers and would encourage Mali's leaders to cooperate in the region's counterterrorism efforts. The U.S. was providing military assistance to Mali, and we hoped it complemented the work Algeria was doing. Ward emphasized that, ultimately, defeating terrorism was the responsibility of the region. Bouteflika expressed his appreciation for U.S. assistance to Mali and said Algeria also provided aid, including some equipment. Bouteflika urged the U.S. to tell Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure that "he cannot be a friend to the thieves and victims at the same time." Many in Mali's security services shared the same concern, Bouteflika asserted. In the past, he said, Algeria has waited for the chance to debrief terrorist suspects held in Mali, only to find out later that Malian officials were conducting negotiations for the terrorist's release back to the terrorist organizations at the same time. "It is difficult to cooperate in these conditions," he said. Despite difficulties, Bouteflika said regional leaders still planned to convene a security and development summit in Bamako. All agreed on the need for the summit, he said, but there was still no set date. Bouteflika said that Algeria would be open to sharing information with the U.S. regarding Algeria's cooperation with its neighbors. General Ward said AFRICOM would do the same for Algeria regarding U.S. initiatives in the region. Egypt and Soccer ---------------- ¶9. (C) Bouteflika shared his perceptions of Egypt's anti-Algerian nationalism following the November 18 World Cup qualifying match. Bouteflika said the Egyptian media had overreacted to the situation and that Algeria did not plan to respond. Algeria could not afford to confuse its historical relationship with Egypt (past, present and future) with the outcome of a soccer match. He said Algeria and Egypt had a number of common political and economic interests and that his country had no desire to have a political crisis over the results of a soccer match. Some have urged Bouteflika to respond publicly to Egyptian claims. "I understand the Egyptians are responding to local conditions," he said, "but we won't take the same tack." Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa, Bouteflika asserted, asked to visit Algiers to mediate the issue. Bouteflika told Moussa there was nothing to discuss in Algiers and suggested Moussa might best mediate tensions by working with Cairo to influence Egyptian opinion. ¶10. (C) Bouteflika noted that the aftermath of the game had been interesting. Moroccan King Mohamed VI sent Bouteflika a very warm message congratulating Algeria on its victory. Bouteflika said he chose not to publicize the letter, in order not to create problems for Morocco in its relations with Egypt. He said Arab political frustrations were sometimes expressed through soccer. Algeria would continue to support Egypt's reconciliation efforts with the Palestinians. No one expects a change in Netanyahu's approach to negotiations, he said. Thus, now was an opportune time to work on reconciliation and encourage Palestinians to speak with one voice. Algeria also supported Egypt's position on Gaza, which was dictated by Egypt's proximity to Gaza and its domestic political environment. "If we were in their position, we would have applied the same policy." Bouteflika said he would prefer to see Egypt concentrate its energies on these issues "rather than against us." Palestine --------- ¶11. (C) Bouteflika noted that Senator Mitchell had said the U.S. was committed to the peace process because it was in the U.S. interest. It was important not to confuse U.S. interests with Israeli interests -- although the two sometimes overlapped -- or Arab interests. Bouteflika lamented current settlement activities, which, he said, undermined peace negotiations. Before negotiations could succeed, settlement activity had to stop first. He added that this included Jerusalem. Any solution that did not take Jerusalem into account would certainly produce future conflict with the Arab and Muslim world. Bouteflika commended President Obama for trying his best to start a new process for negotiations. But President Abbas' and PM Netanyahu's meetings in Washington failed to reinvigorate the process. Bouteflika regretted that no serious negotiation effort has been produced since Oslo, and current efforts in Washington seemed to have no impact. Western Sahara -------------- ¶12. (C) Bouteflika commented that U.S. policy on Western Sahara was inconsistent. Some problems dated back to the Clinton administration, there was improvement under President Bush, but now the State Department seemed to be backsliding. The U.S., Bouteflika argued, was a moral authority and had to show consistency in the principles its foreign policies reflected. "You cannot have one set of principles for Palestine and another set for Western Sahara," he cautioned. Bouteflika remarked that the principle in question -- the right to self-determination -- was clear-cut. UNSYG Personal Envoy Christopher Ross was in charge of finding a solution based on this principle, he said. Now was not the time to adopt a position favoring Morocco's autonomy plan as the solution to the issue. Bouteflika recounted his support for the Baker Plan, and subsequent disappointment when U.S. policy appeared to shift in favor of the Moroccan position on autonomy. Trust was essential, he urged. Algeria wanted a frank, loyal relationship with the United States. It did not want to be a competitor but a full-fledged partner in contributing to solutions in Africa, the Middle East and the Muslim world. Iran ---- ¶13. (C) Bouteflika declared that the U.S. and Algeria shared the same position on Iran, the only difference being that Algeria believed we need to first ensure Iran's efforts are peaceful but then let them pursue peaceful use of nuclear energy without constraints. He had no doubt that the U.S. was capable of reaching a peaceful agreement with Iran and believed the U.S. was in a better position to deal with Iran than either France or Britain. Bouteflika said Algeria appreciated President Obama's patient approach with Iran and had no interest in seeing Iran's influence in the Muslim and Arab world increase. Iraq/Afghanistan ---------------- ¶14. (C) In Iraq, Bouteflika appreciated U.S. and Arab efforts, which were making some progress. Algeria's interest was in the unity of the Iraqi people, ensuring Iraq's sovereignty and maintaining the country's territorial integrity. Bouteflika remarked that a difficult road lay ahead in balancing these priorities and questioned whether the U.S. would have enough time before leaving Iraq to see if a democracy or dictatorship takes root. He recounted an anecdote of a vulture that picks up a snake, struggles to keep the snake from strangling it and finally decides to let the snake go. "The same is true in Iraq," he said. "Sometimes it's best to leave things alone." ¶15. (C) Afghanistan was a different matter. Bouteflika said the world has noted the amount of time President Obama has taken to consider his next step in Afghanistan. Any decision, Bouteflika acknowledged, will be a thorny and difficult one. If President Obama decides to send an additional 40,000 troops, he will need some guarantee he can win. Bouteflika commented this option was plagued by too many unknowns, and the U.S. could find itself in the same position as the Russians. On the other hand, Bouteflika continued, if Obama sends fewer troops and fails, he will be blamed for not doing enough. A decision to withdraw from Afghanistan might trigger a conflict between the administration, Congress and the American people. Bouteflika believed whatever decision the U.S. makes will influence the debate on Afghanistan in partner nations. Meanwhile, questions concerning stability in Pakistan and control of that country's nuclear arsenal further complicated matters. Peace in the region, he concluded, concerned all nations and, therefore, Afghanistan was an international problem. Comment ------- ¶16. (S) The Ward-Bouteflika meeting was significant in a number of respects. The Algerian president spoke repeatedly of his readiness to build a strategic relationship with the US. He transmitted clear readiness for closer coordination and contact on Sahel counter-terrorism issues. The simple fact of the meeting with the president was itself a green light to the military bureaucracy on stepped-up bilateral military cooperation. Not least, the warm and high-level official reception provided a powerful antidote to the persistent negative mythology about Africa Command since the command's rollout. It was also noteworthy that, in the presence of three generals, including the chief of staff, Bouteflika spoke assertively to Ward about civilian control of the military. He described the revolutionary origins of military influence in Algeria, said this so-called revolutionary legitimacy ended in 2004, and the military now obeys the civilians and they all obey the constitution. In the course of his regional political review, Bouteflika delivered Algeria's views on Western Sahara in familiar terms. But in doing so, he also struck an unusually positive note about Morocco and the king's message. Clearly, in the context of the high emotions stirred in Algeria over the controversial World Cup contest with Egypt, Mohammed VI's message of congratulations struck a chord with Bouteflika. JORDAN m ...
