dimanche 5 décembre 2010

Viewing cable 09BAKU478, IRAN VIEW FROM BAKU: VIOLENCE IN BALUCHISTAN

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000478

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 06/03/2019
TAGS PREL, PTER, SNAR, ENRG, ELTN, AJ, PK, TU, TX, IR
BAKU 00000478 001.2 OF 003
SUBJECT: IRAN VIEW FROM BAKU: VIOLENCE IN BALUCHISTAN
REDUCING BORDER SECURITY; GOAJ OFFICIAL WARNS AGAINST MANIPULATION OF IRAN’S MINORITIES; IRAN TRANSIT-ORIGIN HEROIN SEIZURES RISE; ALLEGED PROBLEMS WITH IRANIAN GAS EXPORT DEALS
REF: A) KARACHI 145 B) 2008 BAKU 917

Classified By: POL/ECON COUNSELOR ROBERT GARVERICK, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 

Summary
--------

1. (C) "Iran view from Baku" is the first in an occasional
series from Embassy Baku Iran Watcher that will report on
short and/or partially documented items of interest to Iran
information consumers, but not necessarily warranting
separate cables. This cable includes information on reported
increasing security problems in Iranian Baluchistan,
including alleged disruption of Iran-Pakistan railroad links;
a message from a senior GOAJ military offical about the
dangers of stirring up Iranian minorities; the apparent
quadrupling in first quarter 2009 (compared to first quarter
2008) seizures in Azerbaijan of Iranian- transited heroin;
and skepticism about Iranian gas export contracts, related by
industry participants at the recently-completed Baku Oil and
Gas show. End Summary.

Baluchi Violence Obstructing Iran-Pakistan Rail Link?
--------------------------------------------- -------

2. (C) Several Iranian contacts, including apolitical
businessmen, have told Baku Iran watcher that the recent
suicide bombing of a Sh'ia mosque, and subsequent attack on a
campaign center in Zahedan, reflect a surge in Baluchi
violence in the border area and inside Pakistan that has been
building steadily over several years. According to one
source, the Iranian security forces may be losing effective
control over growing areas in the countryside. All noted
that the rising violence in Iranian Baluchistan is mirrored
and influenced by similar events on the Pakistani side of the
border (recently described in ref(a)).

3. (C) One alleged result is the apparent postponement of
completion of the long-planned improved rail link between
Pakistan and Iran, designed to run through or near Baluchi
territory on both sides of the border. The current rail
connection, running between Quetta, Pakistan and Zahedan,
Iran is in poor condition and has low freight-carrying
capacity. Moreover, according to reports it has recently
been repeatedly subject to rocket attacks and other
disruption by Baluchi tribes. An improved link also
traversing Iranian and Pakistani Baluchi areas was originally
supposed to have been inaugurated in March, 2009, with
container train service beginning in August. According to
Iranian sources in Baku, this deadline is unlikely to be
achieved, and regular use of the Iran-Pakistan railway for
significant cargo shipment is unlikely in the foreseeable
future.

4. (S) xxxxxxxxxxxx quoted the Ministry source as saying that in
2008 Iran asked Pakistan to establish a new, "more secure and
modern" route, but that Pakistan has so far refused. The
source added that Tehran is rife with rumors about the
increasing lack of safety in Baluchi areas, and claimed that
many guard and police posts in Sistan-Baluchistan areas are
no longer occupied at night due to the increased danger of
attack.

5. (C) Another source, xxxxxxxxxxxx blamed the Ahmadinejad
administration for pursuing provocative anti-Sunni practices
(including harassment of Sunni clergy and congregations and
raids on Sunni mosques) and other "arrogant" crackdowns over
the last few years. He claimed that these practices,
combined with high unemployment, perceived discrimination,

Baku 00000478 002.2 of 003

SUBJECT: IRAN VIEW FROM BAKU: VIOLENCE IN BALUCHISTAN REDUCING BORDER SECURITY; GOAJ OFFICIAL WARNS AGAINST MANIPULATION OF IRAN’S MINORITIES; IRAN TRANSIT-ORIGIN HEROIN SEIZURES RISE; ALLEGED PROBLEMS WITH IRANIAN GAS EXPORT DEALS 

and few government services, has increased anger among
Baluchis, and identification of the central government as an
"enemy." He cited the appointment of Ahmadinejad ally
Habibullah Dehmordah as a Governor of Sistan-Baluchistan as a
typical insensitive blunder, calling him a "stupid, brutal,
Sunni-hater." (Note: Dehmordah was replaced as Governor in
2008 by Ali-Mohammed Azad. End Note).

GOAJ Military Figure Opposes Promoting Unrest in Iran
--------------------------------------------- --------

6. (S) At a 12 May meeting with a visiting group of 16 U.S.
military general officers, the GOAJ's Special Assistant to
the President for Defense, General Vahid Aliyev, related that
he had recently met in Iranian Azerbaijan with (unnamed)
high-ranking &Iranian General.8 Although he did not
provide details, Aliyev strongly implied that the Iranian
General raised alleged "foreign-sponsored" efforts to foment
unrest among Iranian ethnic groups, including Iranian
Azerbaijanis (who make up nearly thirty percent of the
Iranian population). Commenting on this issue, Aliyev
asserted that "there have been four attempts by Iranian
Azerbaijanis to assert autonomy in the last hundred years,
all of which were crushed" by the Iranian state. As an
example, Aliyev cited the Soviet effort during World War II
to establish a breakaway "Republic of South Azerbaijan." The
Soviets forces pulled back in 1946, after a "Truman-Stalin
Agreement," which Aliyev depicted as a cynical "betrayal" of
collaborating Iranian Azerbaijanis. He recounted that the
resulting repression by Tehran resulted in the deaths of
60,000 Azeris, and the flight of many more into Soviet
Azerbaijan.

7. (S) U.S. military participants agreed that Aliyev
appeared to be implicitly signaling that outside fomenting of
unrest in Iranian Azerbaijan is opposed by the GOAJ. Aliyev
similarly told the U.S. officers that any foreign war with
Iran will be bad for Azerbaijan, and result in a flood of
refugees entering the country. (Note: The three other
"failed Azerbaijani autonomy struggles" cited by Aliyev
presumably refer to the early 20th century Constitutional
Revolution, Azerbaijani resistance to Reza Shah's
centralization policies in the 1920's, and efforts by senior
Azerbaijani clerics and activists to obtain local autonomy in
the wake of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. End note).

GOAJ Iran-Origin Heroin Seizures Continue Rise
--------------------------------------------- -

8. (C) According to xxxxxxxxxxxx, export of narcotics from Iran
into Azerbaijan continue to skyrocket (see ref b). According
to statistics provided to Baku Iran watcher xxxxxxxxxxxx, Iran-origin heroin seizures (i.e.,
heroin derived from Afghani and Pakistani opium that entered
Azerbaijan from Iran) in Azerbaijan nearly quadrupled during
the first quarter of 2009, as compared to the first quarter
of 2008. According to the GOAJ, virtually all of this heroin
had been fully processed in labs and was "ready for market."
Total heroin seizures in Azerbaijan during the first quarter
of 2008 reflected a sharp increase over the first quarter of
2007; while in 2006 only twenty kilograms of such heroin was
officially reported seized in Azerbaijan during the entire
year. In contrast, reported GOAJ seizures of Iran-origin
heroin during the first quarter of 2009 amounted to nearly
59,000 kilos, as compared to approximately 15,000 kilos of
heroin seized in the first quarter of 2008.

Projected Problems in Iranian Gas Links
---------------------------------------

9. (C) The annual Baku Oil and Gas Show, held June 2-5,
brought a variety of energy company executives and pundits to
Baku, though no senior officials from Iran. An American

Baku 00000478 003.2 of 003

SUBJECT: IRAN VIEW FROM BAKU: VIOLENCE IN BALUCHISTAN REDUCING BORDER SECURITY; GOAJ OFFICIAL WARNS AGAINST MANIPULATION OF IRAN’S MINORITIES; IRAN TRANSIT-ORIGIN HEROIN SEIZURES RISE; ALLEGED PROBLEMS WITH IRANIAN GAS EXPORT DEALS 

interlocutor told Baku Iran Watcher on the side of the show
that xxxxxxxxxxxx had confided to him in a private conversation xxxxxxxxxxxx that he viewed near-term implementation of the
Iranian-Pakistani gas link project as "very unlikely." The
downbeat comment by the xxxxxxxxxxxx was
made despite the recent signing in Istanbul by President
Ahmadinejad and President Zardari of an Iranian-Pakistani MOU
committing to the gas project. According to this source, xxxxxxxxxxxx 
indicated that he had several reasons for this
opinion, but the only one he elaborated was that "the
Pakistanis don't have the money to pay for either the
pipeline, or the gas."

10. (C) Meanwhile, during a panel discussion at the
conference on the future prospects of Caspian gas, several
commentators noted the difficulty of doing business in
"unpredictable, overly bureaucratic" Iran, and the alleged
historical "unreliability" of Iranian gas supply contracts
previously reached with Turkey and Turkmenistan. For
example, panelists recounted that, after long negotiations,
Iran has four times failed to sign separate Liquid national
Gas contracts at the last minute. Two panelists claimed that
Iran has repeatedly diverted gas supplies to meet domestic
needs, thereby interrupting its contractual gas exports - and
has not paid contractual penalties for these violations.

11. (C)  xxxxxxxxxxxx  asserted bluntly that Iranian
political leaders are totally focused on domestic needs and
personal jockeying, and are simply not interested in hearing
about the value of optimizing foreign gas exports. The only
exception, he claimed, is their interest in the notional
prospect of annually exporting ten billion cubic meters
(bcms) of gas to Europe. He attributed this interest to a
conviction that such a deal will significantly increase
Iran's political leverage in Europe and substantially
insulate it from future European pressure - a perception he
characterized as revealing, and "typically" unrealistic.

Derse

Viewing cable 09STATE34688, U) Secretary Clinton’s April 7, 2009 meeting

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S E C R E T STATE 034688 

E.O. 12958 DECL: 04/07/2019 
TAGS OVIP (CLINTON, HILLARY), UAE 
SUBJECT: (U) Secretary Clinton’s April 7, 2009 meeting 
with UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed

1.(U) Classified by Bureau Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

2. (U) April 7, 2009; 1:30 p.m.; Washington, DC.

3. (U) Participants:

U.S.
---- 

The Secretary Acting Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman Jake Sullivan, S staff Barbara Masilko, NEA Notetaker

UAE
--- 

UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ) Ambassador Yousef al Otaiba Abdullah al Saboosi, UAE Notetaker

4. (S) SUMMARY. The Secretary reviewed the status of the US-UAE 123 agreement and additional action the UAE can take to encourage a positive Congressional review. The UAE request for participation in the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF) is under serious consideration. The Secretary expressed her interest in participating in a GCC plus three meeting in Baghdad in the near future. The UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ) also suggested a GCC plus 3 and P5 plus 1 joint meeting to discuss Iran. AbZ confirmed his intention to participate in the Pakistan Donors conference in Tokyo and expressed concerns about Saudi back peddling. The Secretary thanked the UAE for the positive support for both the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Palestinian Authority. AbZ noted that Qatar wants the Arab League to request a meeting with the Quartet focused on settlements and East Jerusalem. END SUMMARY.

-------------------------------------- 
Nuclear Cooperation and Export Control
-------------------------------------- 

5. (S) The Secretary expressed the Administration’s commitment to the U.S.-UAE Agreement for Cooperation on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (aka 123 Agreement). She emphasized that our goal is to get the agreement completed as smoothly as possible. AbZ said that he is delighted with the progress on the agreement. He added that the UAE’s goal is to create a gold standard for a nuclear power program. Then, because of the strong commitments the UAE has made, it will be impossible to have improper use of its nuclear facilities.

6. (S) Turning to the need to be prepared to respond to Congress, the Secretary committed to form a State Department committee including H, NEA and ISN to work on the notification. The Secretary noted the importance of implementing the UAE export control law and continued UAE efforts against illicit Iranian trade and Iranian front companies. The Secretary encouraged action on nonproliferation treaty commitments as especially helpful actions the UAE could take to support our efforts. AbZ noted that the UAE would formally join the additional protocol on April 8.

7. (S) AbZ agreed that the August 2007 export control law had some “loopholes” and said that the UAE Cabinet “revisited” the issue last week. Otaiba said that AbZ had personally intervened to ensure timely action. Otaiba elaborated that the committee charged with implementing the export control law will have its first meeting later this month to begin operations.

8. (S) Otaiba noted that, even in the absence of a formal implementation committee, the UAE is taking action - citing a recent case involving German-made Siemens computers and a Chinese ship bound for Iran interdicted in port in the UAE.

--------------------- 
Major Economies Forum
--------------------- 

9. (S) The Secretary noted UAE interest in the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF). While noting that the UAE does not technically meet the criteria for the meeting, based on size of the economy alone, the Secretary said there are many criteria that make it important for the UAE to attend, adding she will make a recommendation for UAE participation as an observer. AbZ said the UAE bid to host the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) headquarters would be very difficult to achieve if the UAE is locked out of the MEF preparatory meeting in Washington and promised “we will remember your help.”

---- 
Iran
---- 

10. (S) The Secretary said the U.S. is looking to see if Iran can be engaged in any productive manner and noted that Special Advisor Ross would travel to the region soon for consultations. AbZ told the Secretary that UAE feels threatened by Iran today, even though Iran does not yet have a nuclear capability. AbZ asserted that the UAE is even more worried about Iranian intentions than is Israel. AbZ encouraged the U.S. to consider a GCC plus 3 and P5 plus 1 joint meeting.

---------------- 
Iraqi GCC plus 3
---------------- 

11. (S) The Secretary expressed interest in the Iraqi invitations for a GCC plus 3 meeting in Baghdad, at a date to be determined. She noted the value of the GCC plus 3 mechanism not only for furthering Arab engagement with the Iraqi government during a time of transition, but as a way to send a message to Iran that Iraq has broad support in the Arab world.

-------------------- 
Afghanistan/Pakistan
-------------------- 

12. (S) The Secretary told AbZ that the U.S. needs help to stem the flow of funds from the Gulf to the Taliban. She noted that one area of potential action is reviving training related to bulk cash smuggling.

13. (S) Thanking the UAE for hosting the Friends of Pakistan preparatory meeting, the Secretary said she hopes AbZ would attend the April donors conference in Tokyo. AbZ confirmed that he plans to attend and said that the UAE will make a “strong” pledge, but no decision has been made on an exact dollar figure.

14. (S) AbZ express concern over Saudi Arabia’s decision not to make a pledge at the Tokyo conference. AbZ said that the Saudis have never liked the Pakistan Peoples Party, and support Nawaz Sharif. In addition, AbZ posited that Saudi Arabia suspects that Zardari is Shia, thus creating Saudi concern of a Shia triangle in the region between Iran, the Maliki government in Iraq, and Pakistan under Zardari. Feltman noted a pattern of Saudi behavior of withholding financial assistance - not supporting March 14 in Lebanon, not sending funds to the PA, and not planning a pledge for Pakistan. Otaiba added that Saudi Arabia also failed make a commitment at the G20 meeting.

------- 
Lebanon
------- 

15. (S) The Secretary noted the need to support Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in the run up to the elections with concrete displays of support. Feltman added that the UAE had been particularly helpful already by funding the delivery of the first ten refurbished tanks for the LAF. AbZ noted that he would meet with visiting Lebanese Minister of Defense Murr later on April 7. AbZ said the UAE will purchase additional munitions for LAF helicopters, donated by the UAE to LAF last year, but is waiting for France to provide a price estimate.



Viewing cable 07ALGIERS652, ALGERIANS OFFER NEARLY ALL ASSURANCES NEEDED FOR

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S E C R E T ALGIERS 000652 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2017 
TAGS: PREL PTER PINR KAWC PHUM AG
SUBJECT: ALGERIANS OFFER NEARLY ALL ASSURANCES NEEDED FOR 
RETURN OF GTMO DETAINEES 

REF: 2005 ALGIERS 2155 

Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford, reasons 1.4 (b,d) 

1. (S) SUMMARY: In April 21-22 discussions led on the 
Algerian side by Counselor to the President for 
Counterterrorism Issues Kamel Rezag Bara, the government of 
Algeria gave oral assurances to S/WCI Ambassador Williamson 
and an interagency delegation to establish the terms for the 
transfer of Algerian detainees from the U.S. Naval Base at 
Guantanamo to Algeria. A working group consisting of members 
of both delegations encapsulated these oral assurances in 
written minutes of the meetings, which Williamson and Rezag 
Bara initialed at the end of the two-day dialogue. The 
meetings and their output produced sufficient assurances to 
permit the repatriation of the seven Algerian detainees 
scheduled for transfer, except with respect to ensuring that 
these individuals would not pose a security risk to the U.S. 
or international community. The Algerian delegation 
indicated that it took seriously its obligations, but that 
Algerian security services balked at providing such 
guarantees in the written meeting minutes. 

2. (S) SUMMARY (CONT'D): Ambassador Williamson explained to 
Rezag Bara that we sought maximum effort from the security 
services, understanding that there could be no solid 
guarantees. Nonetheless, Rezag Bara said the security 
assurances in writing sought by the U.S. on Algerian 
responsibility for transferred detainees and potential travel 
restrictions after their repatriation could not be given 
without consulting the highest levels of the Algerian 
government. In exchange for receiving additional time (until 
May 31) to coordinate on these outstanding points, Rezag Bara 
and the Algerian delegation agreed to the earliest possible 
transfer of detainee Sofiane Haderbache, who suffers from 
mental illness and for whom the U.S. does not require 
security assurances. At the close of the bilateral 
discussions, both sides agreed that the remaining assurances 
would be worked out between the Algerian and U.S. delegations 
through Embassy Algiers. End Summary. 

COURTESY CALL ON FM BEDJAOUI 
---------------------------- 

3. (S) S/WCI Ambassador at Large J. Clint Williamson and an 
interagency team consisting of Christopher Camponovo (NSC), 
Jay Alan Liotta (DoD), Andrew Morrison (S/WCI), and Vijay 
Padmanabhan (State L) sought assurances from the government 
of Algeria during April 21-22 discussions that would permit 
the return to Algeria of Algerian nationals detained at 
Guantanamo who have been approved for transfer. Williamson 
opened the visit with a courtesy call on FM Bedjaoui during 
which he delivered a letter from Secretary Rice seeking 
Bedjaoui's assistance in providing the Algerian government 
assurances necessary for the transfers. Williamson also 
explained the process by which the U.S. made decisions on 
transferring detainees out of Guantanamo, including the 25 
Algerians on the naval base. 

4. (S) Noting Algerian reluctance to enter into an exchange 
of diplomatic notes offering assurances on security and 
humane treatment of transferred detainees, Williamson told 
Bedjaoui he and his team could work with their Algerian 
counterparts to record the necessary assurances in signed 
minutes of their discussions. The end goal, stated 
Williamson, was to find an arrangement that both fulfilled 
the Administration's policies and satisfied the Algerian 
government. Bedjaoui responded that the Algerian team would 
accommodate Williamson and his team, adding that signed 
minutes were a better vehicle for conveying the necessary 
assurances than an exchange of diplomatic notes. The FM 
observed that the travaux preparatoires for the UN Charter 
are as important as the Charter itself. 

DISCUSSIONS WITH ALGERIAN INTERAGENCY 
------------------------------------- 

5. (S) The Algerian delegation led by presidential 
counterterrorism Counselor Kamel Rezag Bara included 
representatives from the Presidency, Ministry of Interior, 
National Police, security services, Ministry of Justice, and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The senior MFA official 
present was Director General for Consular Affairs Hassane 
Rabehi. The U.S. representatives (paragraph 3) also included 
Ambassador Ford and PolEc Chief. Ambassador Williamson noted 
that the Algerians were a valued partner in counterterrorism 
cooperation and gave an overview of U.S. policy on Guantanamo 
detainees, explaining that the U.S had determined that seven 
Algerian detainees were eligible for transfer. He emphasized 
our need for commitments concerning humanitarian treatment 
for returned detainees and assurances that persons 

transferred do not re-engage in terrorist activity before 
their transfer to Algeria could be effected. 

6. (S) Rezag Bara said Algeria encouraged the U.S. to close 
the Guantanamo detention facility, since its operation 
created image problems for the U.S. among its friends around 
the world. The GOA, he continued, understood the need for 
investigations at Guantanamo on the detained individuals and 
supported a resolution of all Algerian detainee cases. Rezag 
Bara said the Algerian delegation understood what kinds of 
assurances and commitments the U.S. side sought and hoped to 
provide them in the course of their bilateral discussions. 
The presidential counselor stressed the Algerian need to 
ensure that any transferred detainees, unless previously 
arrested or charged in Algeria, were returning to the country 
by their own choice. Finally, he noted that Algerian law 
criminalized terrorist acts committed outside Algeria, even 
if Algeria was not a target of the activity. In this regard, 
the U.S. delegation should expect the Algerian government to 
pursue investigations and charges for returned detainees. 
From its own experience with terrorism, Rezag Bara told 
Williamson, Algeria would take all measures possible to 
prevent re-engagement of the returned detainees in terrorist 
activity. 

LIMITS ON FOREIGN TRAVEL 
------------------------ 

7. (S) Williamson responded that he saw very few differences 
in approach between the two sides. Algeria's taking steps to 
control detainees and keep them from returning to terrorism 
would be sufficient for the U.S. Williamson made clear we 
were not asking Algeria to detain or incarcerate the returned 
detainees; it was sufficient for us to receive confirmation 
that the transferred detainees would be treated in accordance 
with Algerian law and international conventions. DoD's 
Liotta expressed appreciation for the Algerian readiness to 
accept responsibility for what would be in all cases medium- 
or high-threat detainees. He asked if based on Algerian 
review of the detaineesQ, case files there was the likelihood 
of prosecution. Liotta also inquired what measures could be 
taken to limit the foreign travel of returned detainees. 

8. (S) To Liotta's first point, the justice ministry 
representative responded that an investigative judge would 
review facts related to the cases if the detainees once they 
were returned. It would be up to the judge to determine 
whether charges would be filed. Rezag Bara added that as 
part of this judicial review process, the U.S. and other 
third parties could submit evidence for the judge to 
consider. The national police representative, for his part, 
briefed that under Algerian law "convicted and subversive 
persons" lose the right to a passport and are subject to 
additional surveillance. Liotta requested further precision 
about non-convicted persons, since most Algerian detainees 
fell into this category. Rezag Bara clarified that the 
passport was lifted for all convicted persons. Persons who 
"otherwise present a threat but retain a passport" may be 
administratively prevented from leaving Algeria regardless of 
their passport status, said Rezag Bara. He added that both 
judicial and security service reviews of the detainees' files 
would be undertaken following their return. 

CASE OF SOFIANE HADERBACHE 
-------------------------- 

9. (S) Williamson noted that one of the seven detainees whom 
the U.S. sought to transfer to Algeria did not pose a 
security threat and no security assurances were necessary in 
his case. Sofiane Haderbache, said Williamson, had suffered 
a gunshot wound to the head in Afghanistan. As a result, 
this detainee had degenerative brain damage and would require 
extensive medical care for the duration of his life. 
Williamson indicated that the U.S. sought to return this 
detainee quickly, since we believed the mental health 
treatment and attention he required would be well provided in 
Algeria, where Haderbache could be near family and friends 
and receive mental health care in his own language and 
culture. Asked how the Algerians would address Haderbache's 
mental incapacity, Rezag Bara retrieved the case file. 
Reading from it, Rezag Bara noted that Haderbache had one 
outstanding traffic violation but otherwise had no legal 
entanglements. He said the GOA was fully aware of his unique 
medical requirements and was prepared to provide Haderbache a 
psychological and medical evaluation and treatment in an 
appropriate facility upon his return. 

HUMANE TREATMENT AND ICRC ACCESS TO ALGERIAN PRISONERS 
--------------------- ------------------- -------------- 

10. (S) Bara had explained in his opening presentation that 

returned detainees would be fully protected by Algerian law 
and Algerian international human rights commitments. 
Returning to the other six detainees who posed a medium or 
high security threat, Williamson asked if third parties such 
as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had 
access to prisoners in Algeria in the event that some of the 
returned detainees were held in penal facilities for a period 
of time. Rezag Bara responded that through intelligence 
channels the Algerian government could provide the location 
of government facilities in which any returned detainees 
would be held and questioned under the oversight of an 
investigative judge and the Ministry of Justice. The GOA, he 
continued, had no problem with making that information 
available or providing the ICRC access to the detainees under 
existing agreements between the ICRC and the Ministry of 
Justice. Rezag Bara added that ICRC personnel stationed in 
Tunis visited Algerian prisons on a monthly basis to assess 
conditions under which prisoners were held. 

11. (S) In a separate meeting, Williamson met April 22 with 
Mohamed Amara, Director General of Juridical and Judicial 
Affairs at the Ministry of Justice. Amara noted as a point 
of pride the strong cooperation between his government and 
the ICRC, which he explained was critical to the reform of 
jails and prisons in Algeria. He elaborated that the ICRC 
regularly visited Algerian prisons. In response to a 
question from Williamson, Amara explained that the Algerians 
began allowing ICRC access to their detention facilities in 
the 1990s. The ICRC currently, said Amara, has freedom to 
move within Algerian prisons and have direct contact with 
prisoners. He added there are no restrictions on access or 
topics of conversation. According to Amara, AlgeriaQ,s goal 
in cooperating with the ICRC is to ensure that Algeria meets 
international standards of detention. 

DEVIL IN THE DETAILS 
-------------------- 

12. (S) Following the discussions between the two 
delegations, both sides assembled teams to prepare minutes of 
the conversations that would satisfy the U.S. need for 
assurances and the Algerian desire not to provide such 
assurances through the exchange of diplomatic notes. The 
final English-language version of the minutes, which appears 
in paragraph 13 below, was initialed April 22 by both heads 
of delegation along with the final French-language version. 
After protracted discussions led to an impasse on the 
inclusion in the minutes of two security-related points vital 
for the U.S. side, Ambassador Ford proposed working through 
Embassy Algiers to provide acceptable assurances to 
Washington by May 31. (Note: Without additional internal 
discussions, the Algerian security services could not be 
persuaded to lift their objection to including language 
confirming GOAQ,s responsibility for transferred detainees. 
End Note.) Rezag Bara stressed the security services were 
uncomfortable guaranteeing that no returned detainee would 
later leave Algerian territory or return to terrorist 
activity. Williamson emphasized that the U.S. was looking 
for 100-percent effort and understood no 100-percent 
guarantee is possible. If the Algerian authorities become 
aware that a detainee exited Algeria, we merely ask to be 
informed, stated Williamson. The points in question which 
did not appear in the final minutes at GOA request follow: 

-- The Algerian government has agreed to take responsibility 
for these persons in conformity with its legislation and its 
international obligations, and will take all necessary and 
appropriate measures in conformity with its legislation and 
its international obligations to prevent the transferred 
persons from becoming involved in or facilitating terrorist 
activities. 

-- In response to an expressed request of the American 
Government concerning the possibility of the restriction of 
the freedom to travel abroad of the transferred persons, the 
Algerian Government indicated that measures of this nature 
will be taken only in the framework of legislative provisions 
in force. 

FINAL MINUTES AS INITIALED BY HEADS OF DELEGATION 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 

13. (S) BEGIN TEXT OF MINUTES: 

Mr. John Clint WILLIAMSON, Ambassador at Large for War 
Crimes Issues at the U.S. Department of State, conducted a 
working visit to Algiers from April 20 to 22, 2007, 
accompanied by a delegation composed of representatives from 
the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the 
National Security Council. 

During his visit, Mr. John Clint WILLIAMSON called on 
Mr. Mohammed BEDJAOUI, Minister of State, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, to whom he delivered a letter from Secretary of 
State Condoleezza RICE. 

He was also received at the Ministry of Justice. 

A bilateral meeting bringing together delegations from 
the two countries (the members of which appear on the 
attached list) took place at Residence El Mithak on April 21 
and 22, 2007, under the chairmanship of Mr. Mohamed Kamel 
REZAG BARA, Counselor to the President of the Republic, and 
Mr. John Clint WILLIAMSON, Ambassador at Large for War Crimes 
Issues at the U.S. Department of State. 

The discussions concerned the situation of Algerian nationals 
detained at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo. 

The Algerian Delegation and the American Delegation expressed 
their great satisfaction with the quality of relations that 
exist between the PeopleQ,s Democratic Republic of Algeria 
and the United States of America and with the perspectives 
for their expansion and strengthening. 

Both Delegations particularly expressed their joint will to 
reach a comprehensive settlement concerning the situation of 
Algerian nationals detained in the U.S. Naval Base at 
Guantanamo. 

This settlement can be finalized according to a timetable and 
practical modalities to be defined through discussions 
between the two Delegations by the end of May 2007. 

The Algerian Delegation indicated that it had no objection to 
the transfer of the Algerian nationals whose Algerian 
nationality is established, to Algeria or to another country 
of their choice. 

The Algerian Delegation stated that in all cases, its 
nationals will be brought before the national judicial 
authority, which will ultimately determine their status. 

The Algerian Delegation underscored that Algerian legislation 
criminalizes membership by any Algerian national in a 
terrorist organization abroad, even if acts committed are not 
directed against Algeria. 
With respect to the concerns expressed by the American 
Delegation about the treatment of the Algerian nationals 
after their return to Algeria, the two Delegations, after an 
exchange of information, agreed that these concerns are dealt 
with, at a political level, by the consistent commitment of 
Algeria to the fight against international terrorism and, at 
a legal level, by Algerian legislation as well as by virtue 
of the obligations assumed by Algeria in the framework of the 
different pertinent international conventions to which it has 
adhered, notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, as well as the body of international 
instruments relating to human rights and the arrangements 
concluded with the ICRC. 
Within the framework of relevant UN Security Council 
Resolutions for combating terrorism, particularly UNSCR 
1373/01, the two Delegations decided to reinforce their 
cooperation through necessary and appropriate measures, 
notably through the exchange of information and intelligence, 
with the goal of preventing these persons from being able to 
become involved in terrorist activities. 

Taking account of the preceding, the two Delegations accepted 
the principle, as a first step, upon the agreement of 
practical modalities, of the transfer of detainees whose 
names are as follows: 

- TRARI Mohamed 
- FEGHOUL Abdelli 
- HAMLILI Mustapha 
- ABBAR Houari 
- GHALLAB Bachir 
- HADJ-ARAB Nabil 

Due to his health condition, Sofiane HADERBACHE is to be 
transferred as soon as possible. 

END TEXT. 

14. (U) Ambassador Williamson and his delegation have cleared 
the text of this message. 
FORD

Viewing cable 07SANAA473, S) UNMANNED USG AIRCRAFT WASHES ASHORE, OFFICIAL

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E C R E T SANAA 000473 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2017 
TAGS: PREL MASS YM
SUBJECT: (S) UNMANNED USG AIRCRAFT WASHES ASHORE, OFFICIAL 
MEDIA REPORTS DOWNED IRANIAN "SPY PLANE" 

REF: STATE 32641 

Classified By: CDA NABEEL KHOURY, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 

1. (S) On March 27, Yemeni military officers discovered an 
unmanned USG reconnaissance aircraft (Scan Eagle) that had 
washed ashore on the Arabian Sea coast in the province of 
Hadramaut. The President's Office immediately protested the 
incident to CDA and requested an explanation. Initially 
unaware of any USG operations in the area, Post learned after 
further inquiry that the reconnaissance aircraft belonged to 
the U.S.S. Ashland, which had been patrolling as part of 
CTF-150, 60 nautical miles off the Yemeni coast. The 
aircraft had crashed in international waters on March 17 and 
had not been recovered. 

2. (S) On March 28, CDA spoke with President Saleh (who was 
attending the Arab League summit in Riyadh) via telephone and 
confirmed that the aircraft belonged to the U.S. Navy. He 
assured Saleh that the plane crashed performing routine 
reconnaissance near the ship and had not been operating in 
Yemeni territory. CDA also met separately with Interior 
Minister Rashad Alimi and Ammar Saleh, Deputy Director of the 
National Security Bureau, and presented both with general 
information on the aircraft. 

3. (S) President Saleh expressed doubt as to the plane's 
actual mission, but promised CDA that the ROYG would not 
"turn this into an international incident" and would instruct 
government officials not to comment. On March 29, official 
and pro-government media sources reported that the Yemeni 
military had shot down an Iranian "spy plane" off the coast 
of Hadramaut, after communicating with "multinational forces" 
in the region. Independent daily Al-Ayam (largest 
circulating independent newspaper), quoted an unnamed Yemeni 
military official as confirming that the plane belonged to 
the American government, but would not comment on whether the 
plane was shot down or discovered after crashing. 

4. (S) Comment: President Saleh clearly believes the 
unmanned aircraft had been performing reconnaissance in 
Yemeni territory when it crashed. He could have taken the 
opportunity to score political points by appearing tough in 
public against the United States, but chose instead to blame 
Iran. No doubt focused on the unrest in Saada and our 
support for the transfer of excess armored personnel carriers 
from neighboring countries (reftel), Saleh decided he would 
benefit more from painting Iran as the bad guy in this case. 
End Comment. 
KHOURY

Viewing cable 06LAPAZ908, EVO'S POLITICAL ADVISERS (PART 3 )

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 000908 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2016 
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL BL PINR
SUBJECT: EVO'S POLITICAL ADVISERS (PART 3 OF 3) 

REF: LA PAZ 00831 

Classified By: Amb. David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

1. (C) Summary: President Evo Morales keeps several close 
advisers who facilitate and carry out his personal agenda but 
have limited influence on the President's decisionmaking. 
They are split between those who work behind the scenes to 
facilitate Morales' vision and those who are charged with 
intimidating the opposition, especially in Congress. This 
cable is part three of a three-part series examining how 
Morales has structured his advisory circle. End summary. 

----------------- 
Behind the Scenes 
----------------- 

2. (S//NF) Morales has several behind-the-scenes operators 
whose names rarely show up in open sources, but which 
sensitive reporting indicates are key Morales advisers. They 
appear to be loyal to Morales' political vision and work 
closely with the Cubans and Venezuelans in a complementary 
rather than competitive way, unlike Morales' primary 
intellectual advisers (SEPTEL). (Comment: The fact that 
these advisers work behind the scenes suggests that they are 
not seeking public recognition, and Morales is more likely to 
keep them around because of it. End comment.) 

-------------------- 
Ivan Iporre Salguero 
-------------------- 

3. (S//NF) Ivan Iporre is Morales' personal assistant, and 
sensitive reporting indicates that he also has been 
responsible for Morales' personal finances. Iporre controls 
Morales' agenda and access to him. He was one of three 
advisers who accompanied Morales on his world tour in 
January. Two Embassy contacts have said that Iporre is the 
"go-to-guy" for seeking political favors from the President. 

------------------- 
Hugo Moldiz Mercado 
------------------- 

4. (S//NF) Hugo Moldiz, a journalist by trade and a 
well-known FARC and ELN-B contact, appears to hold an 
unofficial advisory position in the Ministry of Government. 
Sensitive reporting indicates that he has been an important 
operator for Morales with the Cubans in Bolivia, particularly 
coordinating the Constituent Assembly agenda and security and 
intelligence issues. Press reports have also highlighted 
Moldiz's role in allegedly organizing local self-defense 
groups, a pet project Morales takes from his years as a 
cocalero leader and may now be inspired by Venezuela's 
President Hugo Chavez. 

-------------------- 
Hector Arce Zaconeta 
-------------------- 

5. (C) Hector Arce is Morales' personal attorney, a position 
he has held for six years. Arce appears to be responsible 
for designing the legal means for Morales to bypass laws the 
President deems inconvenient or for devising legal arguments 
for harassing or attacking Morales' political adversaries, 
such as the lawsuit against former President's Eduardo 
Rodriguez, Carlos Mesa, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, and Jorge 
Quiroga. 

---------------- 
Public Operators 
---------------- 

6. (C) Morales relies on several Congressmen, particularly 
Senate President Santos Ramirez Valverde, Chamber of Deputies 
President Edmundo Novillo Aguilar, and Chamber of Deputies 
member Gustavo Torrico Landa, to intimidate opposition 

LA PAZ 00000908 002 OF 002 


Congressional leaders. Ramirez, Novillo, and Torrico owe 
their career to Morales and may be abusing power much like 
their predecessors. In particular, Ramirez, a blatant 
opportunist who one Embassy contact says would sell his 
mother to get what he wants, has already fallen prey to 
allegations of graft, according to PODEMOS Congressmen (REF 
A). 

7. (C) These advisers operate more as the President's back 
alley thugs than as independent legislators. For example, 
PODEMOS Congressmen have told poloff that their MAS 
counterparts have been digging up dirt from the past and 
blackmailing opposition Congressmen to back the MAS or face 
exposure through the press. (Comment: One Embassy contact 
has referred to the Congressmen as part of the "Cochabamba 
boys"--a reference to the group of associates that Morales 
led over the years in the Chapare that regularly intimidated 
and harassed cocaleros--although only Novillo technically 
represents Cochabamba. End comment.) Further blurring the 
line between the executive and legislative branches, the 
press reported in January that both Ramirez and Novillo moved 
into the presidential palace at Morales' request, although 
Ramirez publicly denies that he lives there. 
GREENLEE

Viewing cable 06LAPAZ906, THE ROLE EVO'S "INTELLECTUALS" PLAY (PART 2)

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 LA PAZ 000906 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2016 
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL BL PINR
SUBJECT: THE ROLE EVO'S "INTELLECTUALS" PLAY (PART 2 OF 3) 

REF: A. LA PAZ 00691 

¶B. LA PAZ 00600 
¶C. LA PAZ 00406 

Classified By: Amb. David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

¶1. (C) Summary: President Evo Morales' circle of Bolivian 
intellectual advisers occupies half of the President's 
Cabinet, including the top three positions: the Vice 
President, the Minister of the Presidency, and the Minister 
of Sustainable Development and Planning. While the 
intellectuals have more influence over the President than his 
domestic political advisers, they also compete with Cuban and 
Venezuelan advisers for Morales' confidence. The second tier 
of intellectual advisers is critical for implementing the 
government's policies, including the Cuban-sponsored 
education program, negotiating new contracts with 
international hydrocarbons companies, and carrying out land 
reform. This cable is part two in a three-part series on how 
Morales has structured his advisory system. End summary. 

-------------------------------------------- 
First Tier of Bolivian Intellectual Advisers 
-------------------------------------------- 

2. (C) The first tier of President Evo Morales' domestic 
intellectual advisers is headed by Vice President Alvaro 
Garcia Linera, followed by Minister of the Presidency Juan 
Ramon Quintana and Minister of Planning Carlos Villegas. All 
three were professors at the Greater University of San Andres 
(UMSA) before joining the Morales administration. Morales' 
intellectual advisers have more sway with the President than 
do his domestic political advisers (SEPTEL), but they also 
compete with Cuban and Venezuelan consultants for Morales' 
confidence. They have pursued their own agenda at times, 
which has angered the President in the past and could push 
him to rely more on his foreign advisers if these practices 
continue. 

-------------------- 
Alvaro Garcia Linera 
-------------------- 

3. (C) Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera is the gatekeeper 
for Bolivian advisers and moderates and adds intellectual 
spin to the President's vision. Nonetheless, Garcia Linera 
is a committed, even devout ideologue and in the past has 
criticized Morales' lack of discipline to leftist ideals 
(NFI). At odds with Morales on several occasions, including 
disagreeing over Cabinet picks, the Vice President has 
struggled to find his niche in the Morales administration and 
may have found it as the MAS go-to-person for the Constituent 
Assembly. 

4. (C) Garcia Linera, ambitious in his own right, was the 
puivotal political orchestrator of the Constituent Assembly 
(CA) process. Garcia Linera, who views the CA as the 
ultimate forum for reforming the state, is working to build 
his reputation as the expert on the issue. He was a gifted 
negotiator during the congressional debate over the convoking 
CA legislation. Embassy contacts say that he was key in 
talking down radical proposals offered by the MAS and 
opposition members, and in forging the final consensus. They 
also note that he had impressive patience and focus during 
the highly charged negotiations. (Comment: Some observers 
say that Garcia Linera has presisdential aspirations; if so, 
recent precedents suggest that the vice presidency is a good 
place to be. It also suggests that he may be competing with 
Morales for public support. End comment.) 

5. (C) A sharp intellectual steeped in largely discredited 
political, philosophical, and economic theory, Garcia Linera 
appears to see Bolivia through the prism of the French 
revolution. In a recent press interview, he said that he 
sees himself as the last Jacobin and Evo as Robbespierre. 
(Comment: The Jacobins and Robbespierre were notorious for 
their reign of terror. They arrested and executed political 

LA PAZ 00000906 002 OF 003 


adversaries and allies alike and ultimately met their demise 
from the same instrument used to execute the opposition: the 
guillotine. To extend the analogy, many pundits have argued 
that Morales may meet his own demise at the hands of 
protestors, just as he was a force during protests to oust 
Presidents Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada and Carlos Mesa. End 
comment.) 

------------------- 
Juan Ramon Quintana 
------------------- 

6. (C) Embassy contacts have said that Minister of the 
Presidency Juan Ramon Quintana is responsible for 
intelligence and military issues, and for coordinating 
Venezuelan and Cuban support. Garcia Linera brought Quintana 
into his position. 

7. (S//NF) Quintana is a disgruntled former military officer 
who was fired from his position in the Ministry of Defense in 
2000 during the Banzer regime. He long suspected that the US 
was behind his firing, a suspicion that has some merit, and 
became stridently anti-U.S. as a result. Quintana, upon 
assuming his current duties, was responsible for the recent 
removal of 29 flag-rank members of the armed forces, most of 
whom were cooperating with the United States. The Minister 
also has been seeking out other officers who have had contact 
with U.S. officials, probably with the intent to fire them. 

8. (S//NF) Quintana's disdain for the United States is so 
deep that he withheld from Morales sensitive information 
passed to him by U.S. intelligence agencies to prevent the 
President from knowing that the Americans were helping him. 
The already suspicious Morales is aware that Quintana 
withheld information, and sensitive reporting indicates that 
he is monitoring the Minister. Morales may choose to 
sideline the Minister if the behavior continues. Sensitive 
reporting also indicates that Quintana has had other problems 
with Morales for paying more attention to getting jobs for 
his friends than focusing on his substantive duties, 
something that could further aggravate the relationship. 

--------------- 
Carlos Villegas 
--------------- 

9. (C) Minister of Planning Carlos Villegas oversees all 
economic coordination and decisionmaking. The Minister of 
Finance reports to Villegas, and not to Morales. Villegas, 
an economics professor from UMSA, is steeped in out-dated 
socialist economic theories and has yet to accept the 
practical realities of a globalized economy. (REF C) 

10. (C) While Villegas may be beginning to understand the 
real impact of free trade on job creation, he appears to 
believe that markets in Venezuela and China serve as 
alternatives to U.S. markets. He has told Bolivian exporters 
to seek markets outside the United States, unconvinced that 
the U.S. is crucial to their trade (REF B). He recently 
returned from Venezuela after negotiating an agreement for 
Venezuela to buy Bolivian soy. Additionally, he has 
regularly antagonized other businesses, telling them that the 
President's Dignity Tariff, a new lower price mean to provide 
cheap electricity to Bolivians is a done deal, remarking that 
the private sector should either get on board or suffer. 
(REF A). 

--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Second Tier of Bolivian Intellectuals Implementing Policy 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 

11. (C) The second tier of intellectual advisers includes 
Minister of Hydrocarbons Andres Soliz Rada, Minister of 
Agriculture Hugo Salvatierra, Minister of Education Feliz 
Patzi, Minister of Finance Luis Arce Catacora, and the palace 
spokesman Alex Contreras. They appear to take instructions 
from the top tier and from Morales himself. At times they 

LA PAZ 00000906 003 OF 003 


appear more like political "operators" (SEPTEL) doing the 
President's bidding. In contrast to the political operators, 
however, the second tier of intellectuals does not tend to 
engage in strong-arming or undermining the opposition. They 
appear to focus almost exclusively on implementing 
policy--including coordinating the Cuban doctors program and 
pursuing land reform. (Comment: Soliz, Salvatierra, and 
Patzi are all associated with UMSA.) 

-------------------------------- 
And then there's FM Choquehuanca 
-------------------------------- 

12. (C) While Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca Cespedes is 
considered one of Morales' most prominent intellectuals after 
Garcia Linera and Villegas, he is more of a figurehead who 
represents the indigenous face of Bolivia. He appears to be 
mostly hot air with no real substantive advisory role in 
traditional foreign policy issues, except for possibly 
maintaining contacts with European NGOs. An overly eccentric 
official, who an Embassy adviser says has a sulfuric 
relationship with most people, Choquehuanca's curious 
statements about his ancestors living for over 200 years and 
replacing milk with coca in a school nutrition program have 
drawn criticisms. Morales' largely discredited arch-nemesis 
Felipe Quispe Huanca has been a vocal supporter of the 
Minister, which only adds to Choquehuanca's trivial role. 
Indeed, Choquehuanca appears to have been only marginally 
involved in Bolivia's key foreign policy issues to date. 
GREENLEE

Viewing cable 06LAPAZ886, EVO AND HIS ADVISORY CIRCLE

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 000886 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2016 
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL BL PINR
SUBJECT: EVO AND HIS ADVISORY CIRCLE ( 


Classified By: Amb. David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

1. (C) Summary: President Morales is an astute domestic 
political operator but lacks confidence in his economic and 
international relations abilities. As a result, Morales has 
surrounded himself with three compartmented groups of 
advisers. The first are domestic political operators who 
implement his political vision and serve as the attack dogs 
for the President. The second group are Bolivian 
intellectuals that help shore up his decisionmaking in 
economics, intelligence and security, and international 
relations, and implement policies on the ground, including 
the Cuban doctors program, Venezuelan identification program, 
and Bolivian land reform. The third group is his Cuban and 
Venezuelan advisers, who seem to have growing influence with 
the President, trumping even his intellectual advisers. This 
cable is part one of three cables that looks at the 
President, who is in his circle of domestic advisers, and how 
he uses them, and their competition with the Cubans and 
Venezuelans for the President's confidence. End summary. 

-------------------------------------- 
Evo: The seasoned Bolivian politician 
-------------------------------------- 

2. (C) Radical cocalero union leader turned President Evo 
Morales Ayma is a pragmatic leader whose domestic political 
instincts are extraordinarily acute. Morales is an expert at 
spinning stories in his favor, co-opting the platforms of his 
adversaries, dividing his opposition, and appealing to his 
bases. A leader with strong anti-democratic tendencies, over 
the years he has been known to bribe, threaten, and even 
physically intimidate anyone who has stood in his way, 
including government officials, politicians, and cocalero 
colleagues. He has shown great tactical flexibility and an 
ability to out maneuver even his most formidable political 
opponents to consolidate his own political power. Morales 
has developed a reputation for consulting advisers and social 
groups on domestic political issues, but is confident that he 
is the expert, the advisor and the final decision maker for 
those issues. (Comment: This is particularly true on the 
coca issue.) His cadre of domestic political advisers 
(SEPTEL), which include Senate President Santos Ramirez, 
lower chamber President Edmundo Novillo, his personal 
assistant Ivan Iporre, and Vice Minister of Government 
Coordination and personal attorney Hector Arce, tends to 
operate more as "yes men" who carry out the President's 
orders than as advisers with real influence on the 
President,s decisions. 

---------------------------- 
Evo: The struggling student 
---------------------------- 

3. (C) While Morales excels at domestic political 
machinations, he is more like a struggling student in the 
areas of economics and international relations 
decisionmaking. A man who likes to be in control, Morales 
has shown an eagerness for learning what he needs to make his 
own decisions in these areas. He has sought out intellectual 
"experts," primarily from Bolivia,s public universities, to 
provide him tutoring in the areas he lacks. Morales often 
tunes out detailed economic discussions with foreign 
officials and will at times defer to his "experts" when 
speaking to the press, large groups, and even US officials on 
issues he is uncertain about. His domestic intellectual 
advisers (SEPTEL), who include Vice President Alvaro Garcia 
Linera, Minister of the Presidency Juan Ramon Quintana, and 
Minister of Planning Carlos Villegas, are largely leftist 
ideologues and have tended to have more influence with the 
President compared to his domestic political advisers because 
of his difficulty grasping complex economic theories and lack 
of experience in the international arena. Unfortunately, 
some of this advice borrows from a storehouse of discredited 
ideas and fantasyland assumptions. 

------------------------------------------ 

LA PAZ 00000886 002 OF 002 


Evo: The Cuban and Venezuelan conspirator 
------------------------------------------ 

4. (S//NF) The third group is a pandora's box of Cuban and 
Venezuelan advisers, who may have growing influence with the 
President. While we do not know the extent of their 
presence, sensitive reporting indicates that Morales meets 
privately with his foreign advisers multiple times a week 
without any domestic advisers present. The same reporting 
also indicates that he receives both political and economic 
advice from the Cubans. Morales is implementing several 
programs initiated by the Cubans and Venezuelans in the areas 
of education, health, and citizen registration. Several of 
the President's domestic advisers are working hand in hand 
with the Cubans and Venezuelans, seeking to replace US 
markets with Venezuelan trade deals, and sensitive reporting 
says that they are regularly traveling to Cuba for political 
training. 

5. (C) Comment: Morales has had a roller-coaster 
relationship with several of his key domestic advisers, 
especially Vice President Garcia Linera. He is highly 
suspicious by nature and is unlikely to tolerate advisers 
with their own agenda for power and recognition. Morales 
likely sees the Cuban and Venezuelan advisers as 
non-threatening to his domestic power. In addition, as an 
admirer of Cuban President Fidel Castro and Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chavez, Morales probably is drawn by the 
longevity of their time in power and seeks to emulate their 
"success." If Morales grows wary of his domestic advisers he 
is likely to rely more heavily on his foreign advisers to 
carry out his vision. End comment. 
GREENLEE

 
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